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The Role of Moral Exemplars in Stanley Hauer's Ethics

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THE ROLE OF MORAL EXEMPLARS IN STANLEY HAUERWAS' VIRTUE ETHICS

by

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

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis is on the virtue ethics of Stanley Hauerwas, with particular focus on the role of moral exemplars in his theory. Hauerwas emphasizes the role of what are called "moral exemplars" in his virtue ethics. These are people or characters of narratives that best exemplify virtue. A theory is exemplarist if the moral concepts of the theory are defined in reference to an exemplary person, moral knowledge is gained from knowledge of an exemplar, and moral exemplars are necessary for one's learning to be moral. This definition reflects the three types of roles exemplars could play in a moral theory. They can play theoretical, epistemological, or pedagogical roles. Hauerwas' moral theory is exemplarist in the fullest sense of the term — Jesus being the supreme moral exemplar for Hauerwas. My thesis is that an exemplarist moral theory like Hauerwas' needs to give a prominent theoretical, epistemological and pedagogical role to moral principles as well as exemplars.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

MORAL EXEMPLARS IN HAUERWAS' ETHICS

Introduction

In twentieth century moral philosophy, there has been a renewed interest in virtue ethics. This renewed interest in virtue ethics seems to be directly influenced by Alasdair MacIntyre's *After Virtue* published in 1981. MacIntyre's work has influenced various strands of moral philosophy ranging from religious ethics to political theory, which is evident in the writings of theological ethicist Stanley Hauerwas. About the influence of Stanley Hauerwas, Jeffery Stout says, "Stanley Hauerwas is surely the most prolific and influential theologian now working in the United States."[1] R. Scott Smith says, "perhaps no other author writing about Protestant theological ethics has contributed as much as Stanley Hauerwas to the present discussion of Christian virtue ethics."[2]

In broad strokes, Hauerwas combines Aristotle's virtue theory and Alasdair MacIntyre's emphasis on practice and narrative/tradition-driven communitarianism with the non-violent pacifism of the Mennonite theological ethicist John Howard Yoder. Because of the influence of modernity and enlightenment philosophy on Christian ethics, Hauerwas thought it important to reinsert the importance of virtue in moral discussion and particularly into Christian ethics. Hauerwas claims that modern ethical theories, such as deontology and utilitarianism, have wrongly focused too narrowly on ethical dilemmas

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[1] Jeffrey Stout, *Democracy and Tradition* (New Jersey: NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 140.

[2] Smith, R. Scott. "Conceptual Problems for Stanley Hauerwas's Virtue Ethics," *Philosophi Christi* 2 Vol 3, no 1, 2001.

and the rightness of action, and left out a significant aspect of thinking about morality, i.e. the person, character, and the virtues.

Hauerwas emphasizes the role of what are called 'moral exemplars' in his virtue ethics. These are people or characters of narratives that best exemplify moral norms, such as virtues. In this chapter, I will seek to abstract from Hauerwas' prolific writings what role moral exemplars play in his virtue ethics. Hauerwas shows his emphasis on moral exemplars saying:

> That is why Christian ethics is not first of all an ethics of principles, laws, or values, but an ethic that demands we attend to the life of a particular individual: Jesus of Nazareth. It is only from him that we can learn perfection which is at the very least nothing less than forgiving our enemies.[3]

Moral exemplars have not received much attention in philosophical or theological ethics. And when they have been given attention, many of the various roles moral exemplars can play in theory are conflated and not distinguished clearly.[4] The quote above indicates ambiguities in Hauerwas' discussion of exemplars. What does "attending to the life of Jesus" show about morality theoretically, epistemologically, or pedagogically? What does it mean exactly? I will evaluate the role exemplars play in Hauerwas' work by making a distinction between a theoretical, epistemological, and pedagogical role exemplars can play in moral theory.

These distinctions about various roles exemplars play in Hauerwas can be applied to and raised about moral theories more generally. It may be useful for discursive

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[3] Stanley Hauerwas, *The Hauerwas Reader*, John Berkman and Michael Cartwright, eds. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 121.

[4] See for instance, Peterson, Gregory R., Spezio, Michael, Slyke, James Van, Reimer, Kevin, and Brown Warren, "The Rationality of Ultimate Concern: Moral Exemplars, Theological Ethics, and the Science of Moral Cognition," *Theology and Science*, 8:2, 139-161.

purposes to divide moral theories into exemplarist theories and principlist theories. A theory is exemplarist if the moral concepts of the theory are defined in reference to a exemplary person, moral knowledge is gained from knowledge of an exemplar, and moral exemplars are necessary for one's learning to be moral. This definition reflects the three types of roles exemplars could play in a theory—the theoretical, epistemological, or pedagogical. A theory is exemplarist in the fullest sense of the term when exemplars serve all three functions.

An implication of this definition is that it is possible for a moral theory to be exemplarist in a more narrow senses as well. A moral theory can be exemplarist in one or two of the roles while not being exemplarist in one of the other roles. This qualification will have implications later on in my examination of Aristotle. A theory is exemplarist in a *theoretical* sense if various moral concepts in the theory are defined in reference to an exemplar (principlists would deny that moral exemplars play this role). A theory is exemplarist in an *epistemological* sense if it holds that certain kinds of moral knowledge are gained only through some kind of knowledge of an exemplar (principlists would deny that exemplars serve any kind of necessary epistemological role). Pedagogically, a theory is exemplarist if the existence of moral exemplars is necessary for developing morally (principlists may say that exemplars are not necessary for learning how to develop morally). Normally, Aristotle is understood to be an exemplarist in respect to some of these roles, whereas, Kant and consequentialists are thought to be non-exemplarist theories and Hauerwas is exemplarist in the fullest sense of the term.

In addition to these roles that exemplars can play in a moral theory, at least two meta-ethical questions are important to ask about moral exemplars. These questions are similar and related to the roles of exemplars in the moral theory. There is a normative question related to exemplars. What virtues does he or she exemplify? Given the exemplar's status as a moral paradigm, what does this imply about what I ought to do or should be? This discussion about moral exemplars also begs an epistemological question of how moral exemplars are known or identified? I will address these two questions in the sections dealing with their analogous role.

In this chapter, I will argue that Hauerwas' moral theory is exemplarist in the fullest sense of the term. The theoretical role for exemplars seems to be that he defines what virtue and virtuous action are in reference to a virtuous person, Jesus Christ. Christian ethics, which he is most interested in doing philosophically, is a narrative-ethics centered on the moral example of Jesus of Nazareth. Christian virtue is defined by the narrative about an exemplar, Jesus of Nazareth; therefore, virtue is defined in reference to an exemplar, Jesus of Nazareth.

In addition to the theoretical role, epistemologically Hauerwas thinks we acquire moral knowledge from the exemplar about the moral concepts of virtue and the good (he avoids talk of principles or rules). The moral knowledge acquired from knowledge of the exemplar is about what the moral character of God is like, the good, and also knowledge about particular moral virtues, constitutive of that good. Last, the pedagogical role is where Hauerwas is the most explicit about moral exemplars. Moral exemplars are

necessary for proper moral education in becoming virtuous. A person becomes virtuous by being apprenticed to and imitating the exemplar.

In response to the meta-ethical questions raised above, Hauerwas seems to think that epistemologically moral exemplars are known or identified because of the community's descriptions of the world and their narratives have designated certain individuals exemplars of the virtues constitutive of the good for that community. Closely related to the epistemological issues, Hauerwas thinks Jesus holds a normative status for others. Forgiving one's enemies is a virtue of Jesus' example. Since Jesus exemplifies this virtue, then we should as well. In this chapter, I will handle each role and question that I have raised in turn.

The Theoretical Dimension

Theoretically, exemplars play a fundamental role in Hauerwas' virtue ethics in a couple of ways. First, Hauerwas' definition of virtue is derived from exemplarist narratives that define the good life and what is constitutive of that good. Second, he places the example of Jesus at the foundation of his theory. Hauerwas thinks the moral concepts of his theory should be defined in reference to the person and example of Jesus.

First, Hauerwas derives his definition of a virtue from narratives that portray the good life and what is constitutive of that life. Hauerwas adopts many of the features of Aristotle's virtue ethics. For Aristotle, the virtues are those excellences of character and activity that constitute the purpose or *telos* for human beings. Human flourishing for Aristotle, or what he calls '*eudaimonia*' means the proper functioning of the rational human animal. For Aristotle, the virtues are those dispositions of character manifested in

activity that are the mean between the extremes of excess and deficiency and are the necessary conditions for the proper functioning of the human being.

However unlike Aristotle, Hauerwas is skeptical about defining moral virtue as the mean. Hauerwas says,

> Aristotle's resort to the mean fails to give an adequate explanation for the individuation of the various virtues. Nor does he seem to appreciate the theoretical significance of the fact that the meanings of individual virtues are relative to different cultural and societal contexts. In the language I used above, he fails to see that the virtues are narrative-dependent.[5]

Hauerwas is concerned that Aristotle's understanding of the virtues as a mean (and Kant's emphasis on moral principles) is unable to give coherence to one's life. There will be competing moral claims on a person that will cause significant moral conflicts between virtues or principles, therefore resulting in a moral incoherence in one's existence. As he says, the self, "is neither a single moral principle nor a harmony of the virtues but....the formation of character by a narrative that provides a sufficiently truthful account of our existence."[6] In other words, "I am suggesting that descriptively the self is best understood as a narrative, and normatively we require a narrative that will provide the skills appropriate to the conflicting loyalties and roles we necessarily confront in our existence."[7] According to Hauerwas, the narrative conception of the self, therefore, is a better way of understanding morality and will provide more moral coherence to one's life than making principles of morality or the virtues fundamental to one's morality.

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[5] Hauerwas, *Hauerwas Reader*, 235.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid, 245. In fact Hauerwas goes on to say, "The unity of self is therefore more like the unity that is exhibited in a good novel–namely, with many subplots and characters that we at times do not closely relate to the primary dramatic action of the novel. But ironically, without such subplots we cannot achieve the kind of unity necessary to claim our actions as our own."

Hauerwas tends to talk about narrative on two levels–on the level of the self and on the level of overarching narratives for communities. On a community level (which influences the narratives of the self), narratives are what frame and define the good for which certain activities are necessary for the achievement of that good. Hauerwas is explicitly endorsing and indebted to Alasdair MacIntyre's views on narrative and virtue in MacIntyre's *After Virtue*.[8] Like MacIntyre, Hauerwas rejects any objectively knowable *telos* for human beings, what MacIntyre calls Aristotle's metaphysical biology. MacIntyre accepts the teleological character of Aristotle's account of virtue, but says, "It [Macintrye's account] is, happily, not Aristotelian in two ways in which a good deal of the rest of the tradition also dissents from Aristotle. First, although this account of the virtues is teleological, it does not require any allegiance to Aristotle's metaphysical biology."[9]

Rather MacIntyre thinks the good, *eudaimonia*, for anyone is relative to and conditioned by that person's membership in a particular community. There are narratives that communities tell and/or hold to be normative in order to make sense out of their existence in the world and give a vision of the good life for the people in that community. The virtues are those habits of action, done in the right manner, constitutive of the good for the community. Hauerwas agrees with this narrative conception of the self and the

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[8] Ibid, 234. Hauerwas quotes affirmatively MacIntyre on narrative from *After Virtue*, "in successfully identifying and understanding what someone else is doing we always move towards placing a particular episode in the context of a set of narrative histories, histories both of the individuals concerned and of the settings in which they act and suffer. It is now becoming clear that we render the actions of other intelligible in this way because action itself has a basically historical character. It is because we all live out narratives in our lives and because we understand our our own lives in terms of the narratives that we live out that the form of narrative is appropriate for understanding the actions of others. Stories are lived before they are told, except in the case of fiction."

[9] Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study of Moral Theory*. 3rd Edition. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2007), 196.

good. A virtue is an activity that is narrative- and socio-culturally, dependent. The good for Hauerwas is defined by narratives and we define what the good life is only by attending to the life of exemplars of that good life. For Hauerwas that narrative is best exemplified by life of Jesus of Nazareth in the Christian Bible.

The second way I believe exemplars play a theoretical role for Hauerwas stems from his use of the moral example of Jesus. Hauerwas believes that Jesus of the Christian Bible is the supreme moral exemplar. The Christian community believes that the Biblical narratives about Jesus are morally normative and those narratives clearly portray Jesus as a moral exemplar. Christians should look to Jesus and define the good in reference to his example. He says,

> When Christians speak of the eternally performing God, a God who not only creates but redeems, they are not referring to some univocal Being but to Father, Son, and Spirit. Indeed, because the Christian God is Trinity and not Being, this makes all the difference to how the character of human actions is understood as participatory in, and thus derivative of, God's action. This is especially important if Jesus Christ is viewed as God's true and most defining act. Because Christ is regarded by his followers as God's most memorable and excellent performance...the implication is that Christian lives, too, can become "holy performances."[10]

What does it mean that "the character of human action is derivative of God's action?" Hauerwas is not trying to make metaphysical claims about theological determinism, rather he is making a moral claim. Because Jesus was the best exemplification of God, we should derive what the character of our lives ought to be from Jesus' example. Hauerwas continues, saying, "We are called to be like God: perfect as God is perfect.....[Christian] ethic(s).... demands we attend to the life of a particular

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[10] Stanley Hauerwas, *Performing the Faith: Bonhoeffer and the Practice of Nonviolence,* (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazo. 2004), 86.

individual: Jesus of Nazareth. It is only *from him* that we can learn perfection (italics mine)."[11] Hauerwas believes that whatever moral perfection is, we need to look at the example of Jesus and define moral perfection in reference to him, which Hauerwas goes on to say later is "nothing less the forgiving of one's enemies."[12] Hauerwas, therefore, defines the concept of moral perfection in reference to Jesus' example of non-violence or peace. Moral perfection is Jesus' example of forgiving of one's enemies, even unto death if necessary. This is an example of how a moral concept like "moral perfection" is defined in reference to the example of Jesus.

The Epistemological Dimension

In addition to a theoretical function, moral exemplars can play an epistemological role in a moral theory. How are the various moral concepts or norms in the theory known? Hauerwas is clear that we primarily know about various moral concepts from the knowledge of exemplars' lives. He explicitly says that we can know the moral character of God, which is perfection, from the example of Jesus. And meta-ethically, how would Hauerwas answer the question of how moral exemplars are known and identified by others? He says that our perception of the world is conditioned by our participation in a certain discrete community with distinct descriptions about the world and exemplarist laden narratives that give a vision of the good. We know who the exemplars are by being part of a community that speaks of certain individuals as exemplars and whose narratives portray certain individuals as exemplars. For Hauerwas, the community is the Christian

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[11] Hauerwas, *The Hauerwas Reader*, 121.

[12] Ibid.

community, the church, and its normative exemplarist 'laden' narratives about the exemplar, Jesus.

First, Hauerwas thinks that moral knowledge about moral perfection and knowledge about what are moral virtues or norms are known from knowledge of the exemplar, Jesus. He says about Jesus,

> We are called to be like God: perfect as God is perfect. It is a perfection that comes by learning to follow and be like the man who God has sent to be our forerunner of the kingdom. That is why Christian ethics is not first of all an ethics of principles, laws, or values, but an ethic that demands we attend to the life of a particular individual: Jesus of Nazareth. It is only from him that we can learn perfection, which is at the very least nothing less than forgiving our enemies.[13]

Because Christian ethics is not primarily one of "ethics of principles, laws, or values," and that "it is *only from him* that we learn moral perfection," he implies that we do not come to Jesus knowing the good, whether that be virtuous action or a whole life, and then see Jesus' conformity to our presuppositions. We do not come to the Jesus of Christian scripture with preconceived notions of the morally right principles and see that Jesus' life and teachings correspond to those universal moral principles.[14] Rather by "attending" to the life of Jesus one comes to know something morally. Moral perfection is not learned merely from reflecting on consequences of actions or deriving moral principles of action

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[13] Ibid.

[14] One response could be to ask "Is it not the case that we presuppose the appropriateness of mercy and justice and then see that Jesus exemplifies those qualities?" Upon reflection, I think Hauerwas would respond affirmatively, but only those traditioned to presuppose the appropriateness of mercy and justice would recognize Jesus as a moral exemplar. And personal moral exemplars of a tradition are the source of that presupposition about mercy and justice. I will seek to address this issue in chapter three of this work. Kant also raised an objection like this, which will be explained in Chapter II where Kant is discussed. Another objection that can be raised is that "attending to the life of Jesus" would involve understanding the teachings of Jesus as well as his behavior; therefore, if teachings are involved, then the learning of principles are important to holding Jesus as a moral exemplar. This objection will be addressed in chapter three.

from reason. Rather, moral perfection is learned directly from knowledge of the life and example of Jesus.

One question I noted above is the normative question about what particular moral virtues Jesus exemplifies. Given that Hauerwas thinks Jesus is a moral paradigm, what moral virtues does he exemplify primarily, and does that tell us anything about how others should live or be? As far as particular moral virtues learned from the life of Jesus, forgiving one's enemies is a virtue and in fact constitutive of moral perfection: "it is only from him that we can learn perfection, which is at the very least nothing less than forgiving our enemies."[15] We can know that particular moral traits are virtues from a person's moral example. The most prominent moral virtue we know from Jesus' example is forgiveness. And because Jesus demonstrates this moral virtue, we should as well. Two important questions to ask about this normative role of Jesus in Hauerwas' ethics are what features of Jesus' example are we called to emulate and how do we determine which features are important and normative? Both of these questions will be addressed in chapter three of this work.

Hauerwas is clear about the epistemological role for exemplars in his theory, but meta-ethically, how are moral exemplars identified in the first place? In order to answer this question it will be helpful to understand Hauerwas's philosophical position on language, community, and narrative. Hauerwas holds an understanding of religious language and beliefs that drives his epistemology. He describes three different understandings of Christian or religious beliefs. First, someone can understand Christian

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[15] Hauerwas, *The Hauerwas Reader*, 121.

beliefs subjectively, as an "array of experiences, dispositions, attitudes, and beliefs."[16] Second, rather than understanding it in subjective terms, Christian doctrine and ethics could be viewed as the "objective content of the Christian religion."[17] The Christian faith is "construed as a set of doctrines, a peculiar body of teaching and instruction."[18] In other words, one could understand Christian belief as objective data, as "out-there" ready to be discovered by human beings. Hauerwas thinks the results of these two views are that viewed subjectively, the Christian faith would be cut off into the realm of the private, thus having no concrete and ethical significance. Christian belief understood as objective data, the Christian faith would be "static and lifeless," thus having no ability to take into account the contingent, situational, and historical character of human experience.[19] He

[16] Hauerwas, *Performing the Faith,* 75.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Though these conclusions that Hauerwas reaches about these different understandings of Christian and religious beliefs seem like non-sequiturs and his notion of subjectivity is ambiguous, my intend on including this schematization of Hauerwas' was to help frame and lead up to the more important philosophical point about Hauerwas' view of language as an activity and how that effects Hauerwas epistemologically.

thinks instead, Christian beliefs and ethics ought to be understood as "activity."[20] He says, "Christian existence is first and foremost an activity—a performance, if you will."[21]

What he means by activity is behavior, and a primary aspect of that behavior is language use. Christian beliefs about the way things are, doctrine, and the right way to live are governed by "communally authoritative rules of discourse, attitude, and action."[22] In other words, "we do not come to know the world by perceiving it, but we come to know the world as we learn to use our language."[23] And, "we have to follow interpersonal rules in a public language."[24] The "public" that Hauerwas is most concerned with is the discrete community of the Christian church. Christians use a particular language to talk about the world, themselves, their actions, and character that is governed by the rules inherent to the Christian community's discourse. As he says in *The State of the University*, "to be a Christian from a cultural-linguistic point of view is not

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[20] Hauerwas, *Performing the Faith*, 75.

[21] Ibid. This classification of Christian belief is taken by Hauerwas from the work of the Yale religion professor, George Lindbeck. In Lindbeck's famous book, *The Nature of Doctrine*, he proposed three models of how religious language (for him doctrines) work: (1)The propositionalist "emphasizes the cognitive aspect of religion and stresses the ways in which church doctrines function as informative propositions or truth claims about objective realities;" (2) the experiential expressivist interprets doctrines as noninformative and non-discursive symbols of inner feelings, attitudes, or existential orientations;" (3) on Lindbeck's own view, the cultural-linguistic or rule model, "the function of church doctrines become most prominent in their use, not as expressive symbols or as truth-claims, but as communally authoritative rules of discourse, attitude, and action." Hauerwas accepts Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic understanding of religious language.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Quoted in R. Scott Smith, "Conceptual Problems for Stanley Hauerwas's Virtue Ethics," *Philosophi Christi* 2 Vol 3, no 1, 2001, 154.

[24] Ibid.

like learning another language, but rather is to learn another language."[25] In his most recent work, he says,

> I suspect that theologians are more like laborers than bricklayers, that is, the theologian's task is to serve those who are masters of the craft of being Christian. Yet if that craft is constituted, as I think it is, by language, then it becomes all the more important that some are trained in the hard work of teaching the language of the craft.[26]

Language conditions the way the world is seen and understood. Religious beliefs about a supernatural being and non-religious beliefs are all formed by the habitual use of their language about the world.

An implication of Hauerwas' views about language is his epistemology. Instead of being able to discover or observe brute facts—and important for our discussion, moral exemplars off of an objective world—no objective world apart from language use:

> the moral life is...not just the life of decisions but the life of vision - this is, it involves how we see the world. Such 'seeing' does not come from *just perceiving* 'facts,' but rather we must learn how the world is to be properly 'seen' or better known. Such learning takes place by learning the language that intends the world and our behavior as it ought to be that the good might be achieved.[27]

The world and language are inherently related, so that there are not facts "out there" to be discovered ready-made and independent of our conceptions of them (as against a Humean naive, empiricist vein). We cannot know the world independently of our characterizations

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[25] Stanley Hauerwas, "Carving Stone or Learning to Speak Christian," in *The State of the University: Academic Knowledges and the Knowledge of God* (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2007), 118. Hauerwas says that MacIntyre thinks that stone carvers are some of the only examples left of what a virtuous tradition entails.

[26] Ibid., 117.

[27] Quoted in R. Scott Smith, *Virtue Ethics and Moral Knowledge: Philosophy of Language After Macintyre and Hauerwas* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 308.

and descriptions of the world. Those descriptions of the world are conditioned by a member of that community's use of language and the descriptions of the world he has been conditioned (or for Hauerwas, traditioned) to use.

The implications for the epistemological question of how Hauerwas thinks exemplars are identified are not difficult to see. To be a Christian is to describe the world and thus see the world in a distinct way. The language that Christians use in speaking of the world and God has built into it (sort of analogous to a grammar) that Jesus Christ is the moral norm for the Christian community. Therefore, one knows that Jesus is a moral exemplar because she is part of a community whose language about the world describes him as such. It would not make sense to Hauerwas to be Christian and not know that Jesus is the supreme moral exemplar. Part of what it means to be a member of the Christian community, a Christian, is to know that Jesus is the moral exemplar par excellence. In fact, to ask *how* you know Jesus is a moral exemplar or *why* he is a moral exemplar is to show that the questioner is attempting an epistemic stance independent of the Christian's language of world.

In addition to Hauerwas' views on language, he emphasizes the role of narrative. Not only is perception of the world determined by language use, our reasoning is dependent on the various communities with their various visions of the good life. By sharing a vision of the good or *telos* of the community, those in the community have a history of practices that constitute what he calls a *tradition*. Part of the tradition involves how the community reasons practically in order to achieve that shared good. As Bunting says about Hauerwas' understanding of rationality, "Rationality.....should not be thought

of in the post-enlightenment way as involving neutral and context-independent ways of judging the claims of competing theories, but as taking different forms in different traditions."[28] Narratives give members of communities a shared vision of the good life. Hauerwas believes that contemporary ethics tends to focus on "quandary ethics" leaving out important information about what went on before or after the moral choice. Modern ethics assume that an universalizible moral principle could be brought to bear on a situational and contextual moral decision. On the other hand, Hauerwas believes that narratives have a normative and morally guiding influence on our moral choices more than principles. As Placher describes, "[for Hauerwas] the story of the good Samaritan may be more use to us than any abstract ethical principle. Stories help us imagine what sort of person we think we ought to be."[29] Rationality itself, following MacIntyre, is conditioned by a tradition of a community transmitted through narratives. As one commentary explains this narrative approach to theology (and, I would add, philosophical ethics),

> The story is not free-standing, it is part of a tradition, it is embedded in a nest of preconceptions that make up a tradition, and that tradition is grounded in a community, which in its turn is nourished by stories. The only view is the view from within.[30]

Hauerwas argues that narratives give a broad and deep picture of a life that a person may want to live. Our moral decisions are better thought of in the context of a life-

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[28] Harry Bunting, "Ethics and the Perfect Moral Law," *Tyndale Bulletin* 51.2 (2000) 255.

[29] David F. Ford, ed., *Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology in the Twentieth Century*. 2nd Ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997) 349.

[30] Alexander Lucie-Smith, *Narrative Theology and Moral Theology: The Infinite Horizon* (Burlington,VT: Ashgate, 2007), 41.

narrative. By looking at moral choices in the context of an entire life, we are forced to ask questions about the moral quality of our lives as a whole: "What is required for our moral behavior to contribute to a coherent sense of self is neither a single moral principle nor a harmony of the virtues but..... the formation of character by a narrative that provides a sufficiently truthful account of our existence."[31] He adds, "Metaphors and stories suggest how we should see and describe the world, that is, how we should 'look-on' ourselves, others, and the world—in ways that rules and principles taken in themselves do not. They do this by providing the narrative accounts of our lives that give them coherence."[32] This aspect of Hauerwas' thinking involves rejecting, or implies a rejection of, Aristotle's notion of a unitary human nature and a stable, yet malleable, part of a self called a character in favor of a narrative conception of the self. Narrative is what gives coherence to a self identity and helps in the orientation to a ultimate purpose in life. For the Christian community, the narratives that it holds to be normative is fundamentally those in the New Testament Gospels about the life of Jesus of Nazareth. The good life for the Christian community is a life of non-violence like that of the narrative's moral exemplar, Jesus. The narratives about Jesus give the members of the community a shared vision of the good life, non-violence, and thus a unified purpose to the community. Therefore epistemologically, one knows that Jesus is an exemplar because her normative narratives portray him as such.

An important conclusion of this notion of language- and community-dependent modes of moral reasoning is that a moral exemplar appears to be relative to different

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[31] Hauerwas, *Hauerwas Reader*, 252.

[32] Ibid.

communities' shared vision of the good. Epistemologically, we can know who the exemplars are and identify them because we are part of a community whose habits of language use have been shaped in such a way as to describe certain individuals as exemplars of what a community's shared narratives say is the good.[33] Moral exemplars, therefore, are not some "thing" that just anyone can read or perceive off of the world. A person must be properly trained as a participant in a community to see, shaped by language use and community dependent narratives, the world rightly, in order to know that a certain person is a moral exemplar. Exemplars are identified by others because of their participation in discrete communities with their exemplarist "laden" narratives and moral descriptions of the world.

The Pedagogical Dimension

Now that I have indicted the theoretical and epistemological roles exemplars play in Hauerwas' virtue ethics, I will consider what role exemplars play pedagogically for Hauerwas. In this dimension, Hauerwas is the most explicit about exemplars. Pedagogically he holds that moral exemplars are essential for moral formation and development. He believes one becomes virtuous by imitating or practicing the activity of the moral exemplar. A couple of concepts are important for understanding the pedagogical questions related to what role moral exemplars play in Hauerwas' virtue

[33] Arthur F. Holmes puts it this way, "For years he [Hauerwas] has stressed the crucial role for Christian community in moral formation. It is there that I find my identity, the kind of people I most respect. For I hear their stories about people of character and vision who founded the place, a heritage that is typical of the Christian story, and then as I watch their lives and adopt their practices, I sense their ideals are becoming my own. I become part of a moral culture." in *Ethics: Approaching Moral Decisions* (Downers Grove, Ill: IVP Press, 2007), 140.

ethics. These concepts are habituation and imitation and Hauerwas' analogy of the moral life as a craft.

Hauerwas assumes he is close to Aristotle's understanding of the moral psychology of learning the virtues. We become virtuous only by habitually practicing those activities that the virtuous do in the manner the virtuous do them, and habituation works by being apprenticed to a virtuous person and imitating what they do (*NE*, 1103a23-24). In his essay, "Character, Narrative, and Growth in the Christian Life," Hauerwas discusses the issue of moral development, particularly in Christian ethics:

> On Moral Development: one, the Christian thinks it is important to live in recognition that life is a gift rather than to live autonomously; two, Christian ethics involves learning to imitate another before it involves acting on principle (though principles are not excluded); three, Christian life is not development, but conversion."[34]

Taking a position apparently against Kant and the role of reason and moral principles in moral psychology, Hauerwas says,

> For Kant also argued that autonomy consists of doing our duty in accordance with the universal law of our being. Such an objection, however, fails to appreciate that for Christians freedom is literally a gift. We do not become free by conforming our actions to the categorical imperative but by being accepted as disciples and thus learning *to imitate a master*. Such a discipleship can only appear heteronomous from the moral point of view, since the paradigm cannot be reduced to, or determined by, principles known prior to imitation. For the Christian, morality is not chosen and then confirmed by the example of others; instead, we learn what the moral life entails by imitating another. This is intrinsic to the nature of Christian convictions, for the Christian life requires a transformation of the self that can be accomplished only through direction from a master. The problem lies not in knowing *what* we must do, but *how* we are to do it. And the how is learned only by watching and following (italics mine).[35]

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[34] Stanley Hauerwas, *Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic.* Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1991), 130.

[35] Hauerwas, *Hauerwas Reader*, 227.

This is the closest Hauerwas comes to explicitly laying out what he believes about the role of moral exemplars in the moral life. He says that such a paradigm —here I take him to be referring to "a proper understanding of moral psychology"—"cannot be reduced to or determined by principles known prior to imitation." He footnotes Aristotle concerning the contingent nature of the moral life. Talk about the moral life is talk about those things that could be otherwise. Hauerwas' claim appears to be an empirical one that we cannot know or learn anything about the moral life by somehow following moral principles discoverable without experience. On the other hand, we come to learn what the morally good is by watching a person who turns out to be a moral exemplar, and then become virtuous by imitating his example. Once those conditions are met, then one will know who the exemplar is, what virtue is, and can become virtuous.

Second, this notion of a master of the moral life comes from Hauerwas' understanding of the moral life as a craft. Provocatively, he says that those who want to know how to become virtuous should learn to lay brick. He says,

> To learn to lay brick, it is not sufficient for you to be told how to do it, but you must learn a multitude of skills that are coordinated into the activity of laying brick—that is why before you lay brick you must learn to mix the mortar, build scaffolds, joint, and so on. Moreover, it is not enough to be told how to hold a trowel, how to spread mortar, or how to frog mortar, but in order to lay brick you must hour after hour, day after day, lay brick.[36]

Whether Hauerwas literally thinks brick laying will make someone virtuous will be set aside, but Hauerwas clearly thinks that, "The crafts and virtues share a common feature,

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[36] Hauerwas' *After Christendom* quoted in Joel James Shuman, "Discipleship as Craft: Crafting the Christian Body," in *Unsettling Arguments: A Festschrift on the Occasion of Stanley Hauerwas' 70th Birthday*. Edited by Charles R. Pinches, Kelly S. Johnson, and Charles M. Collier (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2010), 316.

they both require apprenticeship to a master; both require attention to detail; both require practice."[37] He says because, "we rarely become good by trying to be good, but rather goodness 'rides on the back' of worthwhile activity."[38] His point is that through the activity of habitual practice of certain actions, character is formed to be virtuous or vicious depending on the type of action. Hauerwas thinks that all the activities that make up the whole of a life should be thought of analogically as a craft.[39]

If Jesus is the supreme moral exemplar and we must be apprenticed to an exemplar, then how is one apprenticed to Jesus, who presumably is no longer present? Hauerwas suggests that we need to be part of a community that has examples that resemble the life of Jesus so that one can learn from them how to be virtuous like Jesus. The pedagogy of moral exemplars seems simply not to be a one-to-one correspondence between the learner and the exemplar Jesus but involves a mediation of moral exemplars between Jesus and the apprentices. Hauerwas says,

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[37] Hauerwas, *Performing the Faith*, 157.

[38] Ibid., 160.

[39] One of Hauerwas' students summarizes Hauerwas' understanding of the moral life as a craft saying, "On this both Hauerwas and MacIntyre follow Aristotle, who argues in Book VII of the NE that "every good is the work of craft (techne)." Insofar as living well is a techne, one learns to live well the same way one learns other crafts, by allowing oneself to be made an apprentice to a master. Over time the apprentice learns the goods of her craft and the skills enabling the achievement of those goods. She also learns to understand the difference between work that is genuinely good that which only seems good to the uninformed gaze. These abilities develop as functions of her respect for and submission to the authority of the master, certainly, but also of her understanding at some point that the masters' authority is not absolute, but derives from participation in the history of a tradition that is forever evolving and of which the apprentice is on her way to becoming a member, such that at some point the apprentice herself will become a master and pass along the tradition to others" quoted in Joel James Shuman, "Discipleship as Craft: Crafting the Christian Body," in *Unsettling Arguments: A Festschrift on the Occasion of Stanley Hauerwas's 70th Birthday*. Edited by Charles Pinches, Kelly S. Johnson, and Charles M. Collier. (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2010), 318.

> The Theme of 'imitation' is subject, however, to much misunderstanding. In particular, it carries with it individualist presuppositions that are antithetical to the social nature of the Christian life. For there is no way to learn to 'imitate' God by trying to copy in an external manner the actions of Jesus. No one can become virtuous merely by doing what the virtuous people do. We can only become virtuous by doing what virtuous people do in the manner that they do it. Therefore one can only learn how to be virtuous, to be like Jesus, by learning from others how that is done. To be like Jesus requires that I become part of a community that practices virtues, not that I copy his life point by point.[40]

Instead of having a direct acquaintance between the apprentice and the example of Jesus, mediators who are moral exemplars are needed in order for the Christian to learn how to be virtuous. These mediators, therefore, are ethically defined as exemplars because of their correspondence to the example of Jesus. The learner needs to be apprenticed to and habitually imitate the actions of these exemplars in order to become virtuous herself.

If it is not mere imitation as Hauerwas says, then what conditions must be met in order to properly imitate the actions of an exemplar? He says, "We become just means acting as the just do. Rather, you must feel what the just feel when they act justly."[41] Hauerwas is explicit in a short description of apprenticeship and the virtues,

> To become virtuous one must subject oneself to a master, become initiated into the moral life, and undergo a transformation. For example, the only way that one becomes just is to act the way a just person acts. Each Christian needs to apprentice himself or herself to moral people. But it isn't enough just to copy them. One has to be moral in the way they are moral that it is with the right emotions and right judgments. These are nuances that take years to master. Morality isn't something you can force on people.[42]

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[40] Hauerwas, *The Hauerwas Reader,* 121.

[41] Hauerwas, *Performing the Faith*, 156.

[42] *Hauerwas, Hauerwas Reader*, 529.

Hauerwas argues that merely copying the external actions of an exemplar does not make someone virtuous, rather she must also have the same emotions, judgments, and motivations of the exemplar when performing the action. Those emotions, judgments, and motivations are not a type of knowledge that an exemplar can convey to an apprentice for the apprentice to replicate. These skills of right emotion, judgment, and motivation are something that the apprentice learns through the imitation itself. With the analogy of the moral life as a craft and the Aristotelian concept of habituation in place, here Hauerwas is most clear about the role of moral exemplars pedagogically. Hauerwas assumes in many places that he agrees with Aristotle philosophically about pedagogy, but as will be shown in chapter two and three of this work, Aristotle and Hauerwas may not be as close as Hauerwas assumes.

Two other roles have come to mind in the course of this study. A role closely related to pedagogy is a inspirational role. Exemplars may function as a significant motivation for others to aspire to be virtuous. Hauerwas does not seem to speak to this. Whether this silence is an explicit rejection of this role or simply ignored by Hauerwas is uncertain. Another role that exemplars have in Hauerwas that has become clear through the process of this study is a theological role. This role is close to the epistemological role, in so far as moral exemplars' lives reveal theological knowledge. Clearly, Hauerwas thinks that Jesus reveals knowledge about the nature of God, i.e. God's character, which is moral perfection. Hauerwas makes this point, saying, "the full brilliance and splendor of God's all-inclusive peace has been revealed most clearly in Jesus Christ. The full specification of God's perfect peace, in others words, is most excellently displayed in the

life, death, and resurrection of Jesus."[43] Hauerwas thinks that Jesus is the supreme moral exemplar because Jesus is the best exemplification of the moral character of God. Though significant, this aspect of Hauerwas' ethics will not be pursued until the last chapter.

Conclusion

By way of conclusion and now that we have covered the various distinctions related to moral exemplars in general and in Hauerwas particularly, briefly looking at the exemplarist virtue ethics of Linda Zagzebski will be helpful. Her virtue ethics explicitly emphasizes moral exemplars. Her position provides a useful comparison with Hauerwas' position. In her article "Exemplarist Virtue Theory," Linda Zagzebski argues for a moral theory where the moral concepts of virtue, the good, and right act are defined in terms of a moral exemplar. As she says, "the theory I want to propose is foundational in structure, but the foundation is not conceptual. Instead, the construction of the theory begins with direct reference to exemplars of moral goodness."[44] By direct reference, she means "the picking out" of exemplars of moral goodness without the need for theoretical concepts or philosophical justifications about what makes the exemplar morally good. Epistemologically, we identify exemplars through our emotion of admiration for them. Though I am confident Hauerwas would not entirely agree with Zagzebski's notions of

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[43] Ibid, 88.

[44] Linda Zagzebski, "Exemplarist Virtue Theory." *Metaphilosophy*. Vol 41. Number 1-2. 2010, 49. This article explains how moral theories work with three central moral concepts. These are the good (G), virtue (V), and right act (R). In addition to these moral concepts, there are moral concepts related to acts, right act, virtue act, and duty. The traditional and prominent moral theories of utilitarianism, virtue ethics, and deontology are structured in various ways related to the concepts of the good, virtue, and the right act. She explains that there are non-moral concepts that are foundational to the theory and to which all those moral concepts (the good, virtue, and right act) are defined in terms of. Sometimes this theoretical relationship is one of constituency or one of consequence. Those non-moral concepts are human nature for Aristotle, reason for Kantian deontology, or what everyone desires for classical utilitarianism.

direct reference, foundationalism, and her desire for a pure theory that applies to all moral practices universally, I think her schema of the structure of moral theories in general and her exemplarism in particular are helpful in evaluating the role of exemplars in Hauerwas' virtue ethics.

Like Zagzebski, Hauerwas places moral exemplars, particularly and most fundamentally Jesus Christ, at the foundation of his virtue ethics. Zagzebski and Hauerwas seem to agree on the theoretical role for moral exemplars. For Hauerwas, there is at least one moral exemplar, Jesus Christ, which all the moral concepts of Hauerwas' theory are defined in reference to. Jesus reveals moral perfection. Zagzebski mentions Jesus as a moral exemplar, but moral exemplars hold that position theoretically, whether they are Jesus or someone like Buddha. For Hauerwas, Jesus holds that position in a less formal sense and exclusively, not because he meets some independently defined moral concept of a moral exemplar.

Theoretically, they would disagree about what this structure of their respective theories means for all theories. Zagzebski thinks this is the best way to understand our moral practices and conduct our moral theorizing. Hauerwas, on the other hand, avoids making generalized claims about how other ethical theories work and only talks about *Christian* ethics relative to the Christian narratives about Jesus Christ. Though because of his views about language, narrative, and community, he may agree there will be broad structural agreements regarding different communities way of grounding ethical norms. Another difference between Hauerwas and Zagzebski is that whereas Zagzebski says moral exemplars are identified by others through the emotion of admiration, Hauerwas

implies exemplars are identified by others through their participation in discrete communities with their exemplarist focused narratives that define the good and the virtues constitutive of that good and their moral descriptions of the world.

Though Zagzebski does not mention pedagogical or epistemological concerns in regards to exemplars, one can confidently say that she is clearly is an exemplarist in a theoretical sense. Hauerwas, however, is an exemplarist in the fullest sense of the term. The moral concepts of the theory are defined in reference to a exemplary person, Jesus Christ; moral knowledge about the moral character of God and moral perfection is gained from knowledge of Jesus, and moral exemplars are necessary for one's learning to be moral. Throughout Hauerwas's discussion of moral exemplars he has assumed agreement with Aristotle on many scores and implicitly and explicitly criticized Kant. Because of this, I will examine in the next chapter what role moral exemplars have in Aristotle and Kant by looking at the same roles and questions that were posed to Hauerwas' work.

CHAPTER II

MORAL EXEMPLARS IN ARISTOTLE AND KANT

Like the previous chapter's discussion regarding the role(s) of moral exemplars in Stanley Hauerwas' virtue ethics, I will use the same ethical, epistemological, and pedagogical dimensions to examine the role of exemplars in Aristotle and Kant's ethics. Kant is the target of much of Hauerwas' work and he assumes Aristotle is his philosophical ally. Because of their prominence in Hauerwas' work, the role of them in these classic theories will be briefly covered before turning to chapter three to detail the differences and similarities as compared to the role of exemplars in Hauerwas.

Exemplars in Aristotle's Ethics

Moral exemplars serve a theoretical function for Aristotle. They are the moral standard (what Aristotle calls "the measure") of virtue and the eudaimon life. Aristotle's theoretical role for exemplars implies knowledge of them is necessary for gaining various kinds moral knowledge, such as that of the good or the virtues. However, Aristotle's focus is not moral epistemology and so he avoids detailing precisely what knowledge would be gained from knowing moral exemplary persons. Pedagogically, Aristotle's position on the need for virtuous persons is more nuanced than normally thought. Aristotle's theoretical role for them seems to imply that they are needed for others to become virtuous, as models to emulate consciously. However, what Aristotle explicitly says about pedagogy or becoming virtuous does not entail that exemplars are necessary. Therefore, Aristotle's position is consistent with a role for exemplars in pedagogy, yet he does not explicitly explain how they function pedagogically.

The Theoretical Dimension

Aristotle begins his *Nicomachean Ethics* saying, "Every sort of expert knowledge and every inquiry, and similarly every action and undertaking, seems to seek some good. Because of that, people are right to affirm that the good is 'that which all things seek'" (*NE*, 1094a1-3). This good is *eudaimonia* or "happiness." "But perhaps it appears somewhat uncontroversial to say that happiness [eudaimonia] is the chief good, and a more distinct statement of what is still required" (*NE*, 1097b23). The highest good must not be sought for the sake of any other good, and eudaimonia is that highest good.

Humans by nature have a function, purpose, or telos. Aristotle ties eudaimonia to the concept of a distinctive human nature, and this nature sets them apart from all other living creatures. Just as there are good sculptors, painters, judges or other experts, there are good human beings. To be a good human is to function well or fulfill one's purpose. He says,

> perhaps this [a distinct statement about the good] would come about if one established the function of human beings. For just as for a flute-player, or a sculptor, or any expert, and generally for all those who have some characteristic function or activity, *the good, their doing well, seems to reside in their function*, so too it would seem to be for the human being, if indeed there is some function that belongs to him. (italics mine, *NE*, 1097b23-b29)

Humans share with other creatures being alive and perception, but he identifies the human telos with what is distinct to the human species. The ability to reason is what is distinctly human: "there remains a practical sort of life of what possesses reason; and of this, one element 'possesses reason' in so far as it is obedient to reason" (*NE*,1098a3-a5). The human telos is "the activity of the soul in accordance with reason" (*NE*, 1098a6-18).

The ability to guide our actions by use of reason and for theoretical contemplation is what constitutes humans' nature and function.

Aristotle, summarizing his ethical theory and his understanding of human function, says,

> If the function of human being is activity of soul in accordance with reason, or not apart from reason, and the function, we say of a given sort of practitioner and a good practitioner of that sort is generically the same, as for example in the case of a cithara-player and a good cithara-player, and this is so without qualification in all cases, when a difference in respect of excellence is added to the function (for what belongs to the citharist is to play the cithara, to the good citharist to play it well). If all this is so, and a human being's function we posit it as being a kind of life, and this life as being activity of soul and actions accompanied by reason, and it belongs to a good man to perform these well and finely, and each thing is completed well when it possesses its proper excellence: if all this is so, the human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with excellence. (*NE*, 1098a8-a17)

Eudaimonia is only possible by the person exercising virtue (*arete*) or excellence: "human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with *excellence*," which belongs to the "good man." Good individuals define a good example for that class of individuals. For instance, examples of good harp-playing are the standard by which other harpists are defined as good harpists or not. The same holds for human beings in general. Here Aristotle gives theoretical priority to paradigms of the *eudaimon* person. What is good, excellent, or the eudaimon life for an individual member of the class of humans is defined in reference to good examples of human persons. The exemplars are the standard by which others are measured as virtuous or not and in reference to which a virtuous person is defined. In other words, the exemplar displays standards normative for all individuals of that kind.

This role for exemplars is seen where he says, "Excellence, then is a disposition issuing in decisions, depending on intermediacy of the kind relative to us, this being determined by rational prescription and in the way in which the wise person would determine it" (*NE*, 1106b36-1107a2). Here he introduces the person of practical wisdom, from the Greek, phronimos. These exemplary people are good at deliberating "about the things that are good and advantageous to himself....[and] of things conduce[ive] to the good life in general" (*NE*, 1140a26-a28). They effectively make the moral standard normative for others: "And if this is the right thing to say, as it seems to be, and it is excellence and *the good person*, insofar as he is such, that *is the measure* for each sort of thing, then so too with pleasures: the ones that appear so to him will be pleasures, and things he delights in will be pleasant" (*NE*, 1176a18, italics mine).

Aristotle names one moral exemplar by name, "It is for this reason that we think Pericles and people of that sort wise – because they are capable forming a clear view of what is good for themselves and what is good for human beings in general" (*NE*, 1140b9-b10). They are the standard by which others' character and actions are judged to be virtuous, because whatever excellence is, it is a standard determined by those type of people. Exemplary persons, therefore, serve a theoretical function for Aristotle. In fact, as we will see, this seems to be the main point Aristotle makes throughout in his discussions of virtuous persons.

The Epistemological Dimension

What kind of epistemological role do moral exemplars play for Aristotle? To review, a theory is exemplarist in an epistemological sense if it holds that moral

knowledge is gained only through knowledge of certain persons. Determining if they serve an epistemological role in Aristotle is difficult for a couple of reasons. The theoretical priority Aristotle gives them seems to suggest that they would be essential, if not necessary, for gaining knowledge about moral truths. If they set the standard for what a "good" person is, then it seems to follow that knowledge of one is necessary to know something morally about the world (at least knowing what moral goodness is). However, Aristotle seems to continue to make a theoretical point about exemplars being a moral standard without explicitly saying that they are necessary for us to *know* anything about morality. In other words, Aristotle is not interested in doing moral epistemology, but is more concerned with moral theory as such.

If they set the standard for the "good" person, then it seems to follow that knowledge of one is necessary for others knowing anything about eudaimonia, virtue, character and so forth. However, Aristotle does not refer to this himself, despite the fact there are passages that seem to give an epistemological role to exemplars (such as *NE*, 1176a18 or *NE*, 1106b36-1107a2).

Certain passages of Aristotle do suggest that moral exemplars are necessary for knowing what is virtuous (whether we are talking about character or actions). For instance, "Excellence, then is a disposition issuing in decisions, depending on intermediacy of the kind relative to us, this being determined by rational prescription and in the way in which the wise person would determine it" (1106b36-1107a2). At first glance, he seems to say that the wise person gives us knowledge of excellence in relevant situations. However, I think Aristotle is making the theoretical point again. Whatever the

excellent decision to make (the one hitting the intermediate relative to us) in a situation, the virtuous person will do it. This deliberation of what to do in a particular situation is determined by "rational prescription." Insofar as someone is a virtuous person then he will determine by rational prescription what is the virtuous decision to make with his good in particular and the good in general in view. Here Aristotle is making a theoretical point about the nature of excellent actions as defined as those the virtuous person does, instead of saying that the moral exemplar will give us knowledge about the nature of particular virtues. Because of these considerations, Aristotle is unclear as to what he thinks about an epistemological function of exemplars.

Regarding the meta-ethical question of identifying moral exemplars, how does Aristotle think persons are known to be moral exemplars? He says,

> For one must begin from what is knowable, but there are two senses of "knowable": there is what is knowable in relation to us, and what is knowable without qualification. Presumably, then, in our case, we must start from what is knowable to us. Consequently, in order to listen appropriately to discussion about what is fine and just, i.e. about the objects of political expertise in general, one must have been well brought up. For the starting point is that it is so, and if this were sufficiently clear to us—well, in that case there will be no need to know in addition why. But such a person either has the relevant first principles, or might easily grasp them. (*NE*,1095b5-1095b9)

The things of morality are knowable by those who have been brought up well. He assumes that those who were listening to his lectures on ethics would "know" what he is talking about. Those having shared the same paidea of the cultured Athenian classes would simply understand Aristotle's teaching. They would know that someone is a virtuous and wise person without needing to know why. This is not to deny that they could articulate why. Aristotle says this knowledge of moral truths (including knowing

who are the moral exemplars) has something to do with articulating why. If the person is trained properly by their guardians, then he will have the "relevant first principles, or might easily grasp them" (*NE*, 1095b6-b7). Those that are brought up well will know the relevant first principles and will know that and why someone is a moral exemplar. In other words, either you have been morally trained well and are virtuous and know that Pericles is an example of the virtuous and wise person or not.

The Pedagogical Dimension

Aristotle is more nuanced about this role than ethicists like Hauerwas read him to be. Hauerwas suggests that imitating an exemplar in order to become virtuous is something Aristotle teaches explicitly when talking about habituation and the moral agency of virtuous persons. The pedagogical function of exemplars may be more an implication of Aristotle's theoretical role, rather than something he says explicitly. His discussions about habituation do not mention imitation of exemplars as part of moral pedagogy. In fact, the concept of habituation does not entail imitation, but this does not mean imitation is inconsistent with habituation.

Aristotle thinks the virtues are developed by habituation. This need for habitual practice for moral formation means that humans are not born virtuous; rather, they have the potential to become virtuous, which is the proper actualization of their nature. He says, "the excellences develop in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature, but because we are naturally able to receive them and are brought to completion by means of habituation" (*NE*, 1103a23-24). And:

> for the way we learn the things we should do, knowing how to do them, is by doing them. People become builders by building houses, and harpists by playing

> the harp. Similarly, we become just by doing of just things, moderate by doing moderate things, and courageous by doing courageous things. (*NE*, 1103a30-1103b1)

Habituation is a natural implication of Aristotle's understanding of virtue and dispositions. He defines virtue in terms of a disposition: "excellence, then is a disposition issuing in decisions" (*NE*, 1106b36). Regarding dispositions, "it is in terms of these that we are well or badly disposed in relation to the affections" (*NE*, 1105b25). A disposition is a propensity to feel, reason, and act in a certain characteristic manner is certain circumstances. As Hughes says, "Dispositions are properties of things which give rise to relatively fixed patterns of behavior."[45] These dispositions to act in certain characteristic ways are shaped by habitual practice. This idea of habituation should be distinguished from imitation. Imitation is a kind of habituation, but habituation does not entail imitation. Aristotle is making an emphatic case for the need to develop virtuous habits in order to develop virtuous dispositions and become virtuous. He does this without talking about habitually *imitating* a virtuous person. One needs to habitually practice what is virtuous in order to become virtuous.

However in some passages, Aristotle does seem to say explicitly that one needs to imitate virtuous persons in order to become virtuous. In a discussion about those characteristics that make an action virtuous, he says,

> neither do the case of the skills and that of the excellences resemble each other: the things that come about through the agency of skills contain in themselves that mark of their being done well, so that it is enough if they turn out in a certain way, whereas the things that come about in accordance with excellences count as done justly or moderately not merely because they themselves are of a certain kind, but also because of the fact about the agent doing them, first, if he does them

[45] Gerald J. Hughes, *Aristotle on Ethics* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2001), 54.

> knowingly, secondly if he decides to do them, and decides to do them for themselves, and thirdly if he does them from a firm and unchanging disposition. When it is a matter of having skills, these conditions are not relevant,....but when in comes to having the excellences, knowledge makes no difference, or a small one, whereas the force of the other conditions is not small but counts as everything.....so things done are called just and moderate whenever they are such that the just person or the moderate person would do them; whereas, a person is not just and moderate because he does these things, but also because he does them in the way in which just and moderate people do them. (*NE*,1105a27-1105b9)

At first glance and in the way Hauerwas reads this passage, Aristotle seems to say that imitating a virtuous person is necessary pedagogically.[46] When Aristotle says, "so things done are called just and moderate whenever they are such that the just person or the moderate person would do them; whereas, a person is not just and moderate because he does these things, but also because he does them in the way in which just and moderate people do them" (*NE*, 1105b9). However, this passage is continuing to make a theoretical point about the virtuous person as a moral standard or measure of morality. Just and moderate—in other words virtuous—actions are those that the exemplar does. If someone is to become virtuous, then he needs to habitually have those characteristics (those that the exemplar has) when performing actions as well. Aristotle does not say that one must imitate the particular actions and internal moral agency of a particular exemplar in order to become virtuous. Rather, his main point appears to be a general one about those characteristics of one's agency that make an action virtuous.

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[46] For instance immediately following a quote from Aristotle (*NE*,1105a27-1105b9), Hauerwas says, "To become virtuous one must subject oneself to a master, become initiated into the moral life, and undergo a transformation. For example, the only way that one becomes just is to act the way a just person acts. Each Christian needs to apprentice himself or herself to moral people. But it isn't enough just to copy them. One has to be moral in the way they are moral that it is with the right emotions and right judgments. These are nuances that take years to master. Morality isn't something you can force on people," in Stanley Hauerwas, *Performing the Faith: Bonhoeffer and the Practice of Nonviolence* (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazo, 2004), 158.

In conclusion, Aristotle thinks that morally virtuous persons are the standard or norm by which others are defined and can be judged as virtuous. The strong theoretical role that Aristotle gives to exemplars has implications both for the epistemological and pedagogical roles exemplars play in Aristotle, but he is not explicit about those functions in his ethics. An outcome of this exposition results in him being an exemplarist in a narrow sense. He is clearly an exemplarist in a theoretical sense, however whether he is an exemplarist in a epistemological or pedagogical sense is uncertain.

Exemplars in Kant's Ethics

Moral exemplars do not play a theoretical role in his moral theory, because he grounds his theory in the concepts of a good will, duty, and moral law. Epistemologically, moral knowledge particularly about moral principles can be gained without knowledge of moral persons. In regards to the meta-ethical question of how exemplars are identified, Kant is skeptical about our being epistemically justified in morally assessing other's actions as those that are done from duty and hence are morally good or not. Nevertheless we do assess others' actions morally; and when we do, we necessarily presuppose moral principles in that assessment. Pedagogically, Kant has a certain function for moral exemplars. Because people do exist who perform actions that are in accord with the moral law, we can assume, their actions can be useful in moral pedagogy. Kant nevertheless thinks the use of exemplars for pedagogical purposes can be problematic if done incorrectly. On the whole though, I would not call Kant an exemplarist but rather a paradigmatic principlist who is committed to the supreme moral principle, the categorical imperative. Even the pedagogical use of examples serves to help others appreciate the

motive of duty, respect for the moral law, and their own autonomous ability to do the right thing.

The Theoretical Dimension

Kant starts his most significant work on moral theory, *The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, seeking to define what is unconditionally good. He defines this good as having an intrinsic unconditional worth. The only good that is good in itself is a good "will:" "it is impossible to imagine anything at all in the world, or even beyond it, that can be called good without qualification, except a good will" (*G*, 4.393). He explains, "a good will is not good because of its effects or accomplishments, and not because of its adequacy to achieve any proposed end: it is good only by virtue of its willing, that is, it is good in itself" (*G*, 4.394). We have all kinds of temperaments, natural gifts, dispositions to act in certain ways, and desires. These inclinations are used instrumentally by the will, either in harmful or non-harmful ways. These various qualities of human experience are not intrinsically good, but "presuppose a good will which puts limits on the esteem in which they are rightly held and forbids us to regard them as absolutely good" (*G*, 4:394).

Kant's concept of a good will presupposes that of duty. A good will is that which disposes to act out of duty, in other words, chooses to do the right thing despite many possible inclinations (self-interest, satisfaction of desires and pleasure, etc) to do otherwise. From the practical point of view at least, we have a will that can and does choose between various options in moral deliberation. The good will chooses what it is rational to choose for its own sake. In other words, the person is not acting from impulse,

view to consequences, or physical desire, and therefore the choice is made from a sense of duty. As commentator Thomas Hill explains, "Kant's basic idea of goodness is that it is whatever it is rational to choose" (*G*, 24). For example, suppose a moral decision presents itself to someone. Various reasons for choosing one action rather than another are possible. The rational person is prepared to do the rational thing, come what may. Hill says Kant believes "acts in accord with duty, i.e. acts that fill the requirements, have moral worth if and only if because of a commitment to do what is right" (*G*, 28). If the agent self-consciously wills to do the right thing, then the person acted rationally and from the motive of duty.

Kant moves from notions of a goodwill and duty into a discussion about the moral law. He ties his definition of duty to the moral law saying, "duty is the necessity of an act done out of respect for the law" (*G*, 4:400). Kant's notion of (moral) law is the rational (moral) reason or principle on which we ought to act. As Hill describes the moral law, "to respect the moral law, then, is to acknowledge it as source of rational requirements and so feel constrained to act accordingly" (*G*, 37). The moral law is the rational requirements that are to guide our actions. Kant then defines the morally good in reference to the idea of the moral law saying, "the pre-eminent good which we call 'moral' consists therefore in nothing but *the idea of the law* in itself, which certainly is present only in a rational being–so far as that idea, and not an expected result, is the

determining ground of the will" (*G*, 4:402).[47] Therefore, the argument of *Groundwork* I moves from the concepts of a goodwill and duty to the concept of moral law without appealing to moral exemplars.

At first glance, one could ask, "is not the good will a moral exemplar, and therefore, moral exemplars serve some sort of theoretical function for Kant after all?" Simply because the *Groundwork* begins with a discussion of the good will does not mean that Kant thought the moral law is derived from a good will. A good will presupposes the moral law. For Kant, the theoretical foundation for morality is reserved for the moral law. Nevertheless, Kant thinks ethics must address and apply to human beings as rational beings: "In this way the whole of ethics, which does require anthropology for its application to human beings, should at first be expounded independently of this and fully, as pure philosophy, that is, as metaphysics" (*G*, 4.412). Kant thinks that moral theory is best conceived of as grounded in a metaphysics of morality that is conceptualized and known independent from the empirical science of anthropology.

In fact, Kant thinks that moral theorizing should not and cannot rely on empirical investigation (which would include moral exemplars). As he explains,

> Nor could one give morality worse advice than by trying to derive it [morality] from examples. For every example of morality presented to me must itself first be assessed with moral principles to see whether it deserves to be used as an original example, i.e., as a model. By no means can it have the authority to give us the

[47] About what "the determining ground of the will" means, Thomas Hill says, " 'a determining ground of the will' is the agent's reason, or rationale, for choosing to act in a certain way. It should not be confused with a driving force that causally determines the agent to act. Moral agents are conceived as having a freedom to determine the agent to act. Moral agents are conceived as having freedom to determine their own course of action, even though inclinations and the thought of duty initially dispose them to act one way or another. When choices have been made, the determining ground of an agent's wills, if we knew them, would be expressible as the maxims or 'subjective principles' on which they acted." in Immanuel Kant, *The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*. Thomas H. Hill Jr. and Arnulf Zweig (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002), 268.

> concept of morality. Even the Holy One of the Gospels must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before we can acknowledge Him to be such. Even He says of Himself: 'Why do you call Me (whom you see) good? there is none good (the archetype of the good) but the one God alone (whom you do not see). But where do we get the concept of God as the highest good? Only from the idea of moral perfection which reason designs a priori and connects inseparably with the concept of free will. (*G*, 4:408)

Kant in seeking out the supreme moral principle using an a priori method of analyzing these moral concepts of a goodwill, duty, and moral law and builds his theory out of that analysis. The a priori as it applies to Kant's moral theory is explained by Wood as,

> It is important that on Kant's theory, what is *a priori* is produced by our faculties, not given to them, whether through sensation or otherwise....For Kant, *a priori* principles are precisely those principles generated by our own thinking. They contrast to principles we owe to external sources, such as tradition, authority—or experience, which, apart from the use we make of it through our critical capacities of reason, would be equally a source of blind prejudice.[48]

What is known *a priori* is known to be true independently of sense experience. *A* priori moral principles are those principles that are known by reflecting on the concepts themselves without appealing to anything external to thinking. Exemplars are objects of sense experience and therefore heteronomous to pure reason. Since that is the case, establishing morality on exemplars would not result in the sort of necessary moral truths of reason that Kant thinks are needed to ground morality. In other words, in order for morality to have the binding and unconditional authority that Kant thinks essential to moral obligation, it cannot come from the external sources of experience, tradition, or authority.

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[48] Allen W. Wood, *Kant's Ethical Thought* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 69-70.

The Epistemological Dimension

Kant thinks that moral exemplars are not necessary for moral knowledge. Moral knowledge, especially of moral principles, is derivable without exemplars and known from reflecting on our intuitive understanding of the concept of duty. He is skeptical about our being epistemically justified in morally assessing other's actions as those that are done from duty and hence are morally good. This is one of the reasons Kant denies exemplars a significant epistemological role. Nevertheless we do assess others' actions morally, and he thinks we presuppose moral principles whenever we assess someone as a moral exemplar or not. Moral standards are grounded in the pure reason and the supreme moral principle and presupposed in identifying someone as an exemplar.

Kant thinks knowledge of moral persons is not necessary in order to acquire moral knowledge. Nothing about morality, such as principles of morality, notions of virtue, what the good is, can be derived from knowledge of morally paradigmatic persons. In his work *Religion Within the Boundaries of Reason Alone*, he talks about moral exemplars, and particularly the Jesus of Christianity, conforming to an "archetype" of the moral person that is "lying in our reason," saying,

> The living faith in the archetype of humanity well-pleasing to God (in the Son of God) is bound up, in itself, with a moral idea of reason so far as this serves us not only as a guideline but also as an incentive; hence, it matters not whether I start with this as a rational faith, or with a principle of good course of life. In contrast, the faith in the self-same archetype in its (phenomenal) appearance (faith in the God-Man), as an empirical (historical faith), is not interchangeable with the principle of the good course of life (which must be wholly rational), and it would be quite a different matter to wish to start with such a faith....and to deduce a good course of life from it....Yet in the appearance of the God-Man (on earth), it is not that in him which strikes the senses and can be known through experience, but rather the archetype, *lying in our reason*, that we attribute to him (since, so far as his example can be known, he is found to conform thereto), which is really the

> object of saving faith, and such a faith does not differ from the principle of a course of life well-pleasing to God. (*Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, trans. Theodore Green [Harper Torchbooks: New York, 1960], 109-110)

An archetype for Kant means an idea of reason, which is a construction of reason and not something that is known empirically. He thinks that rather than particular exemplary persons in our experience helping us know what we are morally obligated to do, what is "lying in our reason," such as the concept of duty and the moral law give us that moral knowledge. He continues about how we know what we are morally obligated to do:

> Considering the moral knowledge of common human reason we have thus arrived at its principle, a principle it admittedly does not think about abstractly in such a universal formulation; but which it really does always have in view and employs as the standard in its judging. It would be easy to show here how common human reason, with this compass in hand, knows very well how to distinguish which is good or evil, consistent or inconsistent with duty, in all cases that present themselves. (*G*, 4:403)

We know the difference between right and wrong, good and evil by the use of human reason without the the use of moral exemplars. Human reason has the supreme moral principle as the ultimate justification when judging between right and wrong, rather than the behavior of moral exemplars as moral standards. Moral principles about particular moral actions in our experience in the world can be traced back to and justified on the supreme moral principle. For instance, the principle against lying is morally binding because of its correspondence to the standard of the categorical imperative, not that it is exemplified by or followed by a certain person.

In fact, Kant thinks that circular reasoning would result if someone argued that it was from moral exemplars, whether they be divine or human, that we gained moral knowledge:

> Among the rational or reason-based foundations of morality, the ontological concept of perfection is better than the theological concept that derives morality from a divine or supremely perfect will. It is of course empty, indefinite, and consequently useless for discovering in the boundless field of possible reality, the greatest sum which is appropriate to us. And, in trying to distinguish specifically between the reality here in question from every other reality, it inevitably tends to move in a circle and cannot avoid tacitly presupposing the morality it is to explain. (*G*, 4:443)

Hill explains, "we could not derive our standards of rightness and goodness from the commands of a powerful deity because in order to recognize the deity as worthy of obedience we would need to rely on our prior understanding of rightness and wrongness."[49] Kant thinks those who argue that it is from God's commands that one knows what we are morally obligated to do presuppose the moral principles they seek to derive from those commands. This applies not only to a supernatural deity and its commands, but also in attempting to derive morality from specific exemplars.

How does Kant think moral exemplars are known? Kant is skeptical about judging others' actions as being morally worthy or not. Kant makes a distinction between actions done out of duty and actions done according to duty. An action done according to duty is one that conforms to the requirements of duty externally, such as someone telling the truth, not stealing from a neighbor, or a cashier giving correct change to a customer. These sorts of actions could have been done for reasons other than one's duty to the moral law. They could have been done out of self-interest. The actual actions themselves however are not morally worthless to Kant. They still accord with duty. On the other hand, the same actions of telling the truth or giving the correct change to a customer

[49] Thomas E. Hill, Jr. "Kantian Virtue and 'Virtue Ethics," in *Kant's Ethics of Virtue,* Betzler, Monika, ed. (New York, NY: Walter De Gruyter, 2008), 59.

could be done from a sense of duty to the moral law. In the case of people getting honest treatment from a business owner, Kant thinks we are not justified in believing the owner's treatment of the customers is done from duty, because there could be self-interested reasons as well (*G*, 4:398). Because we do not have epistemic assess to the reasons for action and only those actions done from duty have moral worth, the most we could know is that they were done according to duty.

On another level, even if we were able to identify moral exemplars, we would presuppose moral principles in the assessment of individuals as moral exemplars or not. In other words, a person would be known to be a moral exemplar because of his correspondence to the moral principles that one already presupposes. As Kant says, "For every example of morality presented to me must itself first be assessed with moral principles to see whether it deserves to be used as an original example, i.e., as a model" (*G*, 4:408). Therefore in any knowledge of others, we necessarily assess them using the moral principles and standards that we presuppose. If someone is a moral exemplar, it is because he meets a standard that is in a sense independent of him and the assessor. That standard is the pure principles of reason. Kant's position on this point applies even to our knowledge of God and Jesus Christ, who traditionally and for Hauerwas, were thought to ground morality in the first place. Kant points out that we would not be able to recognize God as morally good if we did not already have some kind of conception of goodness.

The Pedagogical Dimension

Kant clearly has problems with using examples for theoretical and epistemological purposes, but in a later section of his second *Critique* entitled "The Doctrine of the Method of Pure Practical Reason," he makes room for the pedagogical use of examples in his overall ethical project. This would appear to imply that Kant contradicts the disdain he has for exemplars in the *Groundwork.* However, if one keeps the separate projects of the *Groundwork* and "The Doctrine of Method" in view, then no contradiction results from Kant's use of moral exemplars in his practical pedagogy. In the *Groundwork*, Kant's stated aim is to "seek out and establish the supreme moral principle of morality" (*G*, 4.31). His goal of "The Doctrine of Method" in the *Second Critique* is:

> Now, these concepts, if they are to become subjectively practical, must not stay with the objective laws of morality, in order to admire these and highly esteem them in reference to humanity; rather, they must consider the presentation of these laws in relation to human being and to the individual in him. (*CPR*, 157)

The connection between the *Groundwork* and this later section of *Critique of Practical Reason* is that Kant wants to "make *objectively* practical reason *subjectively* practical as well" (*CPR*, 151). Kant thinks that using moral examples can serve that pedagogical purpose well.

He argues that examples are useful in the early stages of moral development in two ways. One part of the method in using examples is to show young pupils what actions that conform to the moral law look like. The second part is to show the sufficiency of the motive of duty. The purpose of using examples is to develop through habit the ability to judge correctly which actions conform to the moral law and to

appreciate ultimately that the motive of duty is a sufficient incentive to do the right thing. The practical application of the method is that the pupil will appropriately value and respect the moral law in his own life as well.

First, Kant thinks that moral exemplars can be used to help students learn over time to make proper moral judgments. As he says,

> the method therefore takes the following course. At first the concern is only to make the judging according to moral laws a natural occupation accompanying all our own free actions as well as our observation of those of other people, and to make it, as it were, a habit, and to sharpen it by first asking whether the action objectively conforms to the moral law. (*CPR*, 160)

That sharpening of the student's moral judgment has a subjective effect on the pupil's moral judgment about her own moral decisions. When the student is in similar situations as the characters they have studied, the student will hopefully do that which conforms to the moral law. Another outcome of this aspect of the Kant's pedagogical method, it allows the pupil to realize an appreciation of the moral law that they already accept as a moral standard and learn to think of their behavior in relation to the law.

The second step of the method in using examples is to show the motivation of duty as a sufficient motive to the do the right thing. He says,

> the second exercise enters upon its task, namely to make the purity of the will discernible in the vivid exhibition of the moral attitude of examples, at first only as a negative perfection of the will insofar as in an action done from duty no incentives whatever of the inclinations influence the action as determining bases. (*CPR*, 160)

The goal of this step of the pedagogy is to show that duty is sufficient enough to motivate a rational being to do the right thing for it's own sake. He uses a story of a man in a dreadful situation where the man is tempted to commit perjury against an innocent man.

The man in the example is pressured with positive incentives of gain and negative threats against his possessions, family, and even his own life. The man remains faithful and resolved to the bitter end to do the right thing and not lie against the innocent man. Kant thinks this example illustrates that duty is sufficient motivation to the right thing, because all sensuous and self-interested incentives point towards bearing false witness. Nevertheless, the man solely for the reason of doing the right thing for its own sake refuses to lie, even if it costs his life. Kant believes the pupil will intuitively grasp that point from examining the story. Since the purpose of the method is to make objectively practical reason subjective, the practical goal of the example is to produce in the pupil an awareness of his own ability to act from the motivation of duty.

Kant is nonetheless cautious about certain ways of using examples in moral pedagogy. If the examples are used in such a way as to make the example a hero or saintly figure that is an exception among the human race, Kant thinks the pupil will come to think of ethics as exceptional as well. The young will be tempted to think they are not capable of doing the right thing like the hero or saint, because only certain special individuals are capable of that. He thinks instead of conceiving these examples as exceptions, they are examples of what anyone and everyone could and should to do. That is do the right thing for it's own sake. The motive of duty is sufficient enough motivation for any rational being. The stories and examples are not useful pedagogically if their purpose is to show what is lacking in human nature, rather the examples help others to appreciate their own moral constitution as rational and free beings that have the ability to do what is right.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown what the role of moral exemplars are in Aristotle's and Kant's moral theories. Morally exemplary persons function theoretically for Aristotle in a way that has implications both for his epistemological and pedagogical roles for exemplars, but he is not explicit about the epistemological or pedagogical function of them in his ethics. Whether he is an exemplarist in these later senses is not entirely certain. Nevertheless, I doubt Aristotle is an exemplarist in the fullest sense of term, but certainly an exemplarist in the more limited and theoretical sense. Kant, on the other hand, is not an exemplarist in his moral theory. Kant gives theoretical priority to goodwill, duty, and the moral law over moral exemplars. If exemplars serve any role for Kant, they serve only as an illustration of the moral law and also as a help to others that living according to the moral law is possible.

This later pedagogical role for exemplars in Kant's practical ethics seems to be overlooked by more virtue-oriented ethics, such as Hauerwas. The reasons for this oversight in Hauerwas is not evident, but his silence on this aspect of Kant's ethics will be explored in the next chapter. There, I will also compare and contrast what I have found out about the roles of exemplars in Hauerwas, Aristotle, and Kant. Based on those considerations, I will then offer a proposal of how exemplars could work better in a virtue ethics like Hauerwas'.

CHAPTER III

HAUERWAS' EXEMPLAR AND MORAL PRINCIPLES

In the first chapter, I examined the role of moral exemplars in the virtue ethics of Stanley Hauerwas. Significant issues and problems with Hauerwas' position were left unresolved until I examined the function of exemplars in the theories of his philosophical sparring partners, Aristotle and Kant. In this chapter, the issues and problems with Hauerwas' exemplarism will be addressed in light of the roles of exemplars in Aristotle and Kant. I will address each issue using the same schema of the theoretical, epistemological and pedagogical dimensions, before offering a proposal about how exemplars may function better in a virtue ethics than they do in Hauerwas'.

Earlier, I made a broad and general distinction between exemplarist and principlist moral theories. My conclusion is that an exemplarist moral theory like Hauerwas' needs to give a prominent theoretical, epistemological and pedagogical role to moral principles as well as exemplars. Theoretically, an exemplarism grounded in the person of Jesus involves an essential role for moral principles. The narratives that are normative for Hauerwas portray Jesus articulating moral principles in his ethics. If one grounds a theory in an exemplary person, then it would seem to follow that the exemplar's teachings would be normative as well.[50] Jesus' teachings involve moral principles that are normative for others. I will articulate what I take to be a moral

[50] This raises the question of the fallibility of the exemplar's teachings. That is an important question. Since I am trying to raise questions about problems internal to Hauerwas' exemplarism, I will avoid that issue here. But if one is going to give an exemplar an important theoretical role in first place, then it is plausible that his teachings could have a normative role. The question of fallibility would need to be applied to the person's behavior and character as well, and Hauerwas' avoids putting Jesus under that kind of analysis. That avoidance may be in virtue of the theoretical role Hauerwas gives Jesus.

principle. Epistemologically, one type of knowledge gained from the person Jesus is of moral principles, as well as knowledge of his moral character.

Pedagogically, because of these theoretical and epistemological considerations, moral principles are an essential part of the practical pedagogy of of a Christian ethic that places Jesus in a normative position. Exemplars can serve a pedagogical role, but that would involve following the moral principles they teach as well as following their example. This seems to be reinforced by the fact that Aristotle's idea of habituation does not entail imitation of an example. One need not slavishly imitate the life of Jesus but follow the principles he espoused. Interestingly, Kant's pedagogical notion of habituation and the use of narrative examples in moral education is consistent with an exemplarism like Hauerwas', but one must keep their theoretical differences in mind. Therefore, in a theological exemplarism of the Hauerwasian type the moral principles taught by and exemplified by the figure Jesus should serve theoretical, epistemological and pedagogical functions.

The Theoretical Dimension

To review, Aristotle and Hauerwas give moral exemplars basically the same theoretical role. The fundamental moral concepts of their theories are defined in reference to a moral exemplar. For instance, Hauerwas defines the concept of moral perfection in reference to Jesus' example of non-violence, and Aristotle gives theoretical priority to paradigms of the eudaimon person. What is the good life is defined in reference to virtuous persons. However, they differ significantly as to whether the exemplar serves as a norm of what is good for all people universally. Whereas for Aristotle exemplars are a

moral norm for the human species generally, Hauerwas rejects Aristotle's concept of a universal human nature and telos and replaces it with exemplar-centric narratives relative to cultural-linguistic communities.[51] Kant, on the other hand, grounds his theory on the concepts of a goodwill, duty and the moral law of pure reason instead of an example of a moral person. Kant believes that deriving the meaning of our moral concepts from examples has serious problems for various reasons. If we were to derive our moral norms from various sources external to human reason, such as tradition, experience or an exemplar, then the moral norm would not have the type of universal and binding authority that Kant thinks is constitutive of moral obligation. If we were to derive our moral norms from an exemplar, this would only be possible through that person's exemplification of moral norms. That is to say, the theory would then be circular in an unphilosophical way.

I will not try to tackle the broad and complex issue of whether a moral theory can be grounded or justified by appeal to exemplars, but I will try to raise criticisms directly related to a moral theory like Hauerwas' that gives such a theoretical role to Jesus. In other words, my criticisms are conditional. If one is going to give such a role to Jesus in a moral theory, then there are some problems and better ways to conceive of such a project. My contention is that in giving a theoretical position to Jesus, then one is committed to

[51] This aspect of Hauerwas' theory commits him to the view that moral exemplars will be relative to various communities' narratives. For the Christian, Jesus is the supreme moral exemplar. For Buddhist communities, the moral exemplar would be Siddhārtha Gautama. For Islamic communities, the supreme moral exemplar would the Prophet Muhammad, and so on. This is not a merely descriptive implication about the way things are, but rather a normative claim. To be part of these communities and their narratives is to be required in some moral sense to give certain persons normative status. For instance, for the Christian whose narrative holds Jesus to be the supreme moral exemplar and his example is one of non-violent pacifism, then Christians cannot endorse narratives that portray people as heroes who commit acts inconsistent with Jesus' example (with that said, it is unclear why there is a need to appeal to narrative to make moral sense of this type of moral reasoning. One could be committed to non-violence in principle and morally evaluate situations in view of that principle).

giving his teachings a prominent theoretical role. The exemplar's teachings cannot be abstracted from the person's actions or character. Since Hauerwas gives a theoretical role to Jesus of Nazareth, then he should hold Jesus' teachings to be normative as well. Those teachings involve Jesus using imperatives, and more generally, principles that prescribe conduct. For instance, Jesus commands charity saying, "Give to the one who begs from you, and do not refuse the one who would borrow from you (Matthew 5:42)," or "Give to everyone who begs from you, and from one who takes away your goods do not demand them back (Luke 6:30)."[52] Examples of this feature of Jesus' life abound, and more are given below.

Christian ethicists recognize this aspect of Jesus' ethics. Glen H. Stassen and David P. Gushee in their book *Kingdom Ethics: Following Jesus in Contemporary Context* point out that Jesus in the New Testament repeatedly uses moral principles in his teaching. Some examples include:

> "Love your enemies" is one. Another is "Do to others as you would have them do to you" (Mt. 7:12). Another is "Love your neighbor as yourself" (Mt 22.39). Another is "Love the Lord God with all your heart, and with all soul, and with all your mind" (Mt 22:37).[53]

Jesus also used stories, examples, parables, along with principles in his moral teachings. My notion of a moral principle is largely borrowed from Stassen and Gushee.[54] In addition to their definition of a principle, I am indebted to New Testament scholar, N.T.

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[52] All biblical quotations are from the Holy Bible, *English Standard Version* (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Publishers, 2001).

[53] Glen H. Stassen and David P. Gushee, *Kingdom Ethics: Following Jesus in Contemporary Context* (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2003), 103.

[54] I am not talking about moral principles in a specific philosophical sense as something like Kant's categorical imperative or rule-utilitarianism — something from which a systematic hierarchy of principles and rules could be derived. I am not sure Jesus' ethics work that way, but I am certain Jesus appears to use principles that prescribe what others should do.

Wright's definition of a moral principle: "A principle is a general statement of how things should be, from which specific rules might be derived.....You act from principle – say, that one should always ('in principle,' as we say) preserve life and not destroy it. You obey a rule – 'Do not commit murder.'"[55] I define a principle as a general prescription meant to guide actions and conduct.

Gushee and Stassen actually have a four fold schema of understanding moral reasoning and the ethics of Jesus. They say there are four levels of moral norms in Christian Ethics. The particular/judgment level, rules level, principle level, and the basic conviction level. The judgment level consists of particular moral judgments where in fact no reasons are given for the moral judgment and applies to one's moral reaction in one particular case. At the rule level, a rule applies not just to one immediate case, but to all similar cases and tells us directly what to do or not to do. Principles are general reasons given to support rules or criticize them. Principles are more general than rules and do not tell us directly and concretely what to do in every circumstance. At the basic conviction level, a basic conviction is the basis for our principles, rules, and overall moral reasoning. They think the reasoning works from basic convictions to principles to rules to particular moral judgments — from the general to the particular. They give alot of examples for each level from the narratives of the New Testament Gospels. Since my concern is not moral reasoning in Christian ethics, I will focus on that aspect of Jesus' teachings that I believe Hauerwas neglects, moral principles.[56]

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[55] N.T. Wright, *After You Believe: Why Christian Character Matters* (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2010), 46.

[56] Stassen and Gushee, 100-107.

Hauerwas seems to overlook this aspect of Jesus' example. I am not sure if this oversight is due to issues related to the traditional debate between virtue and deontological moral theory. The view is that Aristotle is concerned about character and virtue, rather than duty and moral principles. Hauerwas thinks that Christian ethics is better conceived as an ethic of character and virtue, and that may be the case, but any morality that gives a theoretical function to a person like Jesus would be missing an important aspect of Jesus if it ignored his teachings. If those teachings involve moral principles, then an ethic grounded on his example involves moral principles. How principles work within an ethic of character and virtue is a project beyond the purview of this thesis, but it seems plausible that a theory that would give a role to character, virtue and moral principles is not incoherent and in fact is a plausible and in many ways a desirable theoretical option.

In fact, Thomas Aquinas thought Jesus taught both and that they can work together in a moral theory. He argued that the moral teachings of the Jewish Old Testament that Jesus assumed and Jesus' teachings, called the New Law, prescribe moral virtue and have a teleological character. He says:

> All the differences assigned between the Old and New Laws are gathered from their relative perfection and imperfection. For the precepts of every law prescribe acts of virtue. Now the imperfect, who as yet are not possessed of virtuous habit, are directed in one way to perform virtuous acts, while those who are perfected by the possession of virtuous habits are directed in another way, For those who as yet are not endowed with virtuous habit are directed to performance of virtuous acts by reason of some outward cause.....On the other hand, those who are possessed of virtue are inclined to do virtuous deeds through love of virtue, not on account of some extrinsic punishment of reward.[57]

[57] Quoted in Daniel Daly, "The Relationship of Virtues and Norms in the Summa Theologiae," in *The Heythrop Journal*. LI (2010), 214.

Aquinas thinks there is a teleological character to the relationship between principles, or what he calls precepts, and virtue. For Aquinas, the "moral precepts are teleological. Their proper *finis* is to inculcate virtue. The ultimate end of moral precepts is the full moral virtue of the person."[58] Aquinas thinks that one can talk about character and virtue being prescribed by Jesus. In fact, there is plentiful example of this in Jesus' teachings. In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus's longest section of teachings in the narratives about him, Jesus says,

> Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are those who mourn, for they shall be comforted. Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth. Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they shall be satisfied. Blessed are the merciful, for they shall receive mercy. Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God. Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God. (Matt 5:3-9)

Jesus used language about what people should be. They will be meek, justice-seeking, merciful, pure in heart, peacemaking people. Jesus, therefore, was equally concerned with what people are to be.

There may be a distinction to be made about the use of principles. They can be used in an action guiding role or as justification for actions. The rules and principles could be something we consciously have in mind when we act. In trying to determine what I should do, legitimate moral considerations exist on both sides. I end up deciding I should do *A* because to *not-A* would be misleading and potentially deceptive. I am consciously using a (vaguely stated) rule or principle to guide my actions. One can also appeal to rules or principles in order to provide an account for why such and such is

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[58] Ibid., 215.

wrong or right — in other words, as a justification for the action. Therefore, principles could be important for justification without being always held consciously in mind when performing certain actions. Aristotle seems to view the virtuous as making decisions without explicitly appealing to principles and rules, but that however does not entail that principles are irrelevant to ethics more generally. As was pointed out by Aquinas, principles and rules can serve as appropriate guides for behavior, especially understood as leading teleologically to becoming virtuous.

Jesus' ethics, therefore, has both virtue-oriented and deontological features. Jesus taught using imperatives that are prescriptive moral principles for conduct. He gave prescriptions of what one should do. He also taught about virtuous character. He gave prescriptions of the type of person his follower should be. Jesus gives a normative role both to moral principles and virtuous character. Two conclusions are to be made from these observations about the Jesus' moral teachings. First, character terminology may not be wholly reducible to prescriptive statements of conduct. However, Jesus clearly used imperatives implying he thought principles are morally binding in at least a broad sense on his followers behavior. Second, my general argument does not necessarily depend on whether Jesus' ethics is an ethics of virtue or principlist in orientation.

First, the character talk cannot be reduced to rules for behavior, but Jesus clearly used imperatives implying he thought they should be binding in at least a broad sense on his followers' behavior. Certain commands of Jesus such as, "Do to others as you would have them do to you" (Mt. 7:12), are difficult to interpret as anything other than a prescriptive moral principle. This could be interpreted to mean that one's character is to

be the type that one considers others before themselves. Interpreting some of Jesus' teachings could be helpful in avoiding the apparent moral dilemmas that would arise if the command was a principle to be strictly followed. For instance, Jesus says, "Give to everyone who begs from you, and from one who takes away your goods and do not demand them back" (Luke 6:30). Some instances like this do sound more like a characterization of a certain sort of ideal or a more general point about values rather the statement of a rule. The main point being that one is to be generous and giving to those in need. One, however, needs to be careful with sort of move, because that seems to be to take what clearly is statement prescribing certain sorts of actions and behaviors and translating it into descriptions of character. The virtue-oriented interpretation cannot consistently do the very thing that is denied a more principlist interpretation. I think Jesus' ethics includes and emphasizes virtue/character and principles/actions, so work needs to be done on reconciling those different types of moral teachings. This chapter's focus is on the way what I call moral principles fill in features lacking in Hauerwas exemplarism.

Second, my view does not necessarily require me to taking a stand on the larger theoretical debate between deontologists and virtue-ethicists. If one is going to give a theoretical position to Jesus, then he needs to give Jesus' moral teachings a theoretical position as well. Since Jesus taught about virtue and character, then those moral teachings will have a theoretical role. The proper character to have is that type taught by Jesus. But because Jesus taught both, then Jesus' teachings about virtue and character and his use of moral principles should have a theoretical role. Jesus tells his followers what they should

do and what they should be. This thesis, however, is not about this relationship between deontological and virtue oriented features of Jesus' ethics, but about the role of exemplars in Hauerwas' ethics and the way the moral principles taught by Jesus help to solve issues raised by Hauerwas' reductive exemplarism.

This role of moral principles in Jesus' ethics helps to solve a problem raised in chapter one with Hauerwas' christological exemplarism. What features of the exemplar's behavior are normative for others? Simply observing the behavior of Jesus in the narrative of the New Testament Gospels will not tell us which features of his life others are obligated to follow. Determining which features are normative is especially difficult for a figure like Jesus, who was a first century Palestinian Jewish man, two thousand years separated from modern day readers. Because of this cultural and chronological distance, there are features of his life, moral and non-moral, that contemporary followers need to discern which are normative for them. For instance, are his followers moral obligated to imitate his riding of donkey into cites, as he did into Jerusalem, or should they literally wash others' feet like Jesus did for his disciples? If not or if so, what is the criteria for making that determination?

One way to answer this question could be to reduce Christian ethics to a system of commands and principles given by Jesus, without paying any attention to his conduct and behavior. Questions related to which aspects of his example are normative would then be muted. This turns Jesus merely into a teacher of rules and principles, but that is not the type of role Hauerwas thinks Jesus should have in an ethic morally grounded on him. I agree and acknowledge that Jesus taught about virtuous character and exemplified

virtuous character. Jesus' life is exemplary, not just his teachings. But if someone is going to hold Jesus to be the standard, then his teachings are also normative, not merely his life.[59] Jesus teaches his followers which features of his life are normative. For instance, Jesus' example of non-violent pacifism is not only a feature of his life particularly, but he tells his listeners that they are to turn their cheeks when insulted and to love and pray for their enemies.[60] Jesus leads by example in taking care of the needy and feeding the hungry, but also tells his followers that the greatest command is to love their neighbor as themselves. Jesus' commands work in conjunction with his example, and so neither is complete without the other.

The Epistemological Dimension

To review, at one level Hauerwas and Aristotle seem to be in disagreement that knowledge of moral exemplars is necessary for gaining various kinds moral knowledge about the good, the virtues, moral principles and so forth. Aristotle does not say explicitly that knowledge of moral exemplars is necessary in order to gain moral knowledge. In fact, it seems Aristotle knows about eudaimonia, what virtue is, what the virtues are, and other moral concepts of his theory without saying that knowledge is gained from knowledge of the relevant exemplars. However, if the exemplar is a moral standard for

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[59] There may be other sources of knowing which features are normative, such as Kant's moral principles of pure reason or consequential considerations, but that is to change an exemplarism like Hauerwas' into a moral theory that is not strictly exemplarist in the senses I have defined it. To say that is not an argument against using those sources or against changing Hauerwas' theory. It is to only restrict my project to further developing an exemplarism that has a prominent role for principles as well as an exemplar like Jesus, rather than attempting to alter Hauerwas' Christological exemplarism fundamentally into just another form of deontology, utilitarianism or virtue ethics.

[60] For instance, in the Gospel of Luke Jesus says, ""But I say to you who hear, Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you," (Luke 6:27). Or where he says, "But love your enemies, and do good, and lend, expecting nothing in return, and your reward will be great, and you will be sons of the Most High, for he is kind to the ungrateful and the evil" (Luke 6:35).

others, then it would seem to follow that knowing an exemplar is essential in gaining knowledge of moral truths. Hauerwas is clear that knowledge of particular exemplars is necessary for others to acquire moral knowledge about the virtues and so forth. Kant clearly thinks we can obtain moral knowledge without knowing certain persons. He thinks we necessarily presuppose moral principles in our knowledge of others as exemplars or not. The exemplar confirms what can be known independently of them.

In this section, I want to address a particular aspect of Hauerwas' epistemological role for Jesus. What kind of moral knowledge is gained from Jesus? Is it knowledge of the good life, duty, virtues, principles? Hauerwas argues that we come to know about virtue primarily from Jesus' life. I want to argue that the kind of knowledge we learn from Jesus may be about character and virtue, but knowledge of moral principles is gained from Jesus' teachings as well. This seems to follow naturally from the theoretical position Hauerwas gives Jesus.

Hauerwas thinks that knowledge about moral perfection and moral virtue is gained from knowledge of the exemplar, Jesus. He says,

> We are called to be like God: perfect as God is perfect. It is a perfection that comes by learning to follow and be like the man who God has sent to be our forerunner of the kingdom. That is why Christian ethics is not first of all an ethics of principles, laws, or values, but an ethic that demands we attend to the life of a particular individual: Jesus of Nazareth. It is only from him that we can learn perfection, which is at the very least nothing less than forgiving our enemies.[61]

Hauerwas claims that "forgiving our enemies" is a Christian virtue learned from the example of Jesus. A question is whether this is a moral principle taught by Jesus. I believe this is the case. The reason why is related to the theoretical point that moral principles are

[61] Hauerwas, *The Hauerwas Reader*, 121.

a component of Jesus' teachings. Jesus teaches moral principles, non-violence evidently being one of them. In Jesus' famous "Sermon on the Mount," he teaches about non-violence using imperatives. He says,

> You have heard that it was said, 'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.' But I say to you, Do not resist the one who is evil. But if anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if anyone would sue you and take your tunic, let him have your cloak as well. And if anyone forces you to go one mile, go with him two miles. Give to the one who begs from you, and do not refuse the one who would borrow from you. "You have heard that it was said, 'You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.' But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you. (Matt 5:38-44)

This is an example of a passage from the narratives about Jesus that Hauerwas could appeal to for his non-violent pacifism, and Jesus clearly uses imperatives to teach this aspect of his ethics. For instance, "Do not resist.....turn to him....let him...go with him....do not refuse....love your enemies and pray for those" are all in the form of imperatives — in other words, moral principles expressed in a particular grammatical form. Jesus' pacifism may be conceptualized in virtue-oriented terms of a non-violent character and disposition, but it is not simply about virtuous character. Jesus thought it important to use imperatives in his ethics as well, and his non-violent pacifism is known through his teaching of moral principles and through his own example of non-violence.

As to the epistemological question of how moral exemplars are identified or known, Kant, Hauerwas, and Aristotle seem to agree that our knowledge of the world is not presupposition-less. For Hauerwas, our epistemic access to the world is affected by our participation in a moral community with its descriptions about the world and narratives of the self and good. For Aristotle, our epistemic stance toward ethics is affected by our moral upbringing:

> in order to listen appropriately to a discussion about what is fine and just, i.e. about the objects of political expertise in general, one must have been well brought up. For the starting point is that it is so, and if this were sufficiently clear to us — well, in that case there will be no need to know in addition why. But such a person either has the relevant first principles, or might easily grasp them. (*NE*,1095b5-1095b9)

Kant need not deny this Aristotelian point that upbringing affects how readily someone will be open to the relevant moral first principles.

Kant argued that we would not be able to recognize Jesus or any other moral exemplar as good or their actions as right unless we already presupposed those concepts of goodness and rightness. In the *Groundwork* where Kant makes this point, he has a negative attitude towards using exemplars because he is worried about the justification of fundamental moral principles in that work. Those principles are presupposed in morally evaluating a person as an exemplar or not. His point is plausible and consistent with an exemplarism like Hauerwas' which is grounded on Jesus. Once someone's status as a moral exemplar has been established, then we could learn various kinds of moral knowledge from that person. The moral norms and concepts we employ to recognize anyone or any action as morally good or not are not derived from something else that is more fundamental, however. This way of conceiving moral epistemology does not entail that we cannot come to know anything morally from our experience. In other words, I can know Jesus is a moral exemplar because of moral concepts given by reason or natural law, but then come to learn much about morality and being moral from him. I think this way of conceiving how we can know whether Jesus or anyone else as an exemplar helps

to solve the problems raised by Hauerwas' claim that it is "*only from* Jesus that we learn about the good and virtue" (italics mine).[62]

The Pedagogical Dimension

Pedagogically, Hauerwas thinks he is adopting Aristotle's position on the need to imitate a moral master in pedagogy. As I read Aristotle on exemplars, the need for them seems an implication of their theoretical role. Aristotle's emphasis on the need for habituation does not say something about nor entail the need to imitate exemplars. Hauerwas interprets Aristotle as saying that habitually imitating an exemplar is what is needed in order for one to become virtuous. He says, "yet according to Aristotle,.....To be sure, the arts and the virtues share common features. Both require apprenticeship to a master; both require attention to detail; both require practice."[63] He clearly thinks that Aristotle thought it necessary to be apprenticed to a master in order to acquire the virtues. In fact, Hauerwas quotes affirmatively a long quote from *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1103b26-30 in order to make this point about Aristotle's understanding of the virtues, exemplars, and imitation in pedagogy. As I tried to show in chapter two, Aristotle makes primarily a theoretical point about exemplars in his discussion about what makes a person virtuous, rather than a pedagogical point.[64] Theoretically, the characteristics that make a person virtuous are those the virtuous person has. Since those are the characteristics of the virtuous person, then others should have those characteristics as well.

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[62] Hauerwas, *Hauerwas Reader*, 121.

[63] Hauerwas, *Performing the Faith*, 157.

[64] Ibid. In places, Hauerwas sounds as if he is making the theoretical point as well. He says, "this [Aristotle's quote in NE 1103b26-30] means that someone may 'copy' the actions of a just person, but the action quite literally is not the same action if the habits that make the agent just are absent." Here Hauerwas' point is that certain characteristics or habits make an action virtuous.

Because of this reading of Aristotle, Hauerwas' concept of imitation of exemplars has a couple of problems that could be solved by incorporating a role for principles into moral pedagogy. There is an epistemological problem of knowing the moral psychology of the exemplar so that others can imitate that aspect of the standard. Another problem is that in the early stages of moral pedagogy principles seem essential to learning what to do and how to do it.

First, there is an epistemological problem of knowing certain features of the psychology of the exemplar in order to imitate it. Hauerwas says, "One has to be moral in the way they [the exemplars] are moral — that it is with the right emotions and right judgments."[65] How would we know about those features of the exemplar's moral agency in order to imitate it? Knowing the moral psychology of Hauerwas' supreme moral exemplar is extremely difficult. Jesus is a historical figure who lived over two thousand years ago. Hauerwas' best source for such information about Jesus would be the New Testament Gospels and other documents from the First Century. As I already pointed out, those sources portray Jesus as using principles and commands in his ethics. In order to know the psychology of a moral agent, the exemplar needs to relay that information to the pupil. If that is the case, then the propositional content of the exemplar's teaching seems to be essential. Giving this role to principles in the concept of imitation seems to be the most promising solution to the epistemological problem of knowing something about the psychology of the exemplar in order to imitate it.

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[65] Ibid., 158.

The second problem with Hauerwas' pedagogical role of moral exemplars is that principles are important in the early stages of moral development. If I am to become skilled morally, then principles as guides for action seem necessary in learning to be moral. Just as someone learning to lay brick (a favorite analogy of Hauerwas') needs rules, at least initially, principles and rules are helpful in learning to do the right thing morally. Over time, if a person repeatedly acts on principle or complies with rules then she may learn to act in the right manner without consciously appealing to the principle. In other words, moral habits develop because of actions done to comply with principles. For instance, a lifeguard at a local beach learns to risk her life based on the principle that saving a person's life is morally commendable or appropriate, given her position and its responsibilities. Yet after repeated acts of that type, she simply saves others lives without thinking at all about the reasons she did it or the justification for doing it. She has become a virtuous life guard. Later if called upon, she could most likely articulate the reason (the principle) why her actions were appropriate. This way of using principles in moral education is consistent with Aristotle's understanding of habituation, Kant's use of examples in practical pedagogy, and an exemplarism like Hauerwas'.

Furthermore, from what I have argued so far about the role of moral principles in the ethics of Jesus, it follows that those same principles are an essential part of a pedagogy that gives Jesus his theoretical status in Christian ethics generally and Hauerwas' in particular. Because an exemplarism in the robust Hauerwasian sense is concerned with the example of Jesus, the pedagogy would involve reflecting on the life and actions of Jesus. However as I pointed out above, his actions and example will need

to be interpreted through Jesus' self-explanations and moral principles in order to know which features of his example are normative. Jesus' example and the moral principles he teaches are part of Jesus' pedagogy and fills in features that are lacking in Hauerwas' view of Christian pedagogy.

Interestingly, Hauerwas and Kant both give a prominent role to narratives and characters of those narratives in moral education. Hauerwas thinks that he and Kant have competing, perhaps contradictory, understandings of the role of narrative and examples in pedagogy. Hauerwas quotes the section on examples from Kant at length, saying,

> "The living faith in the archetype of humanity well-pleasing to God (in the Son of God) is bound up, in itself, with a moral idea of reason so far as this serves us not only as a guideline but also as an incentive; hence, it matters not whether I start with this as a rational faith, or with a principle of good course of life. In contrast, the faith in the self-same archetype in its(phenomenal) appearance (faith in the God-Man), as an empirical (historical faith), is not interchangeable with the principle of the good course of life (which must be wholly rational), and it would be quite a different matter to wish to start with such a faith....and to deduce a good course of life from it....Yet in the appearance of the God-Man (on earth), it is not that in him which strikes the senses and can be known through experience, but rather the archetype, lying in our reason, that we attribute to him (since, so far as his example can be known, he is found to conform thereto), which is really the object of saving faith, and such a faith does not differ from the principle of a course of life well-pleasing to God." (*Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, trans. Theodore Green [Harper Torchbooks: New York, 1960], 109-110)
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> It is extremely instructive to note the contrast in style between Kant's way of doing ethics and works dealing with the spiritual life. For the latter, the use of examples is crucial, as they invite the reader to imaginatively take the stance of another as the necessary condition for the examination of their own life. Thus, for example, in William Law's 1728 *A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life* (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), characters are created and discussed with almost the same detail as a novelist. Indeed, it may be for that reason that the novel remains our most distinctive and powerful form of moral instruction. [66]

[66] Hauerwas, *The Hauerwas Reader*, 225, fn7.

Not only do exemplar-centric narratives play theoretical and epistemological roles for Hauerwas' views about the virtues, he thinks narratives are essential for moral education. Narratives give a broad and deep picture of another's life; it allows one to see the character of another's life over a period of time and ask whether he could imagine living his own life as a whole that way. That examination of the character then helps the learner to examine her own life in light of the example.

Hauerwas thinks this approach to practical pedagogy is significantly different than Kant's. But as I showed in the last chapter, Kant allows for an important role for narrative in moral education. Kant thinks examples illustrate the moral law so that others will know what living according to the moral law looks like, the motive of duty is sufficient motivation to do the right thing, and that through habitual moral judgment about the examples, the pupil will learn to make the proper moral decisions in his own life. The ultimate goal of using examples from history and literature is to cultivate an appreciation of the moral law in the pupil. Kant, therefore, sounds close to Hauerwas when Hauerwas argues that novels are the most important form of moral education. The main pedagogical difference between them is the difference between Kant's emphasis on duty and principle as what will ultimately give the learner's actions their moral rightness and Hauerwas' point that the example's life on its own is the moral norm for others. For Kant the example teaches that doing something for duty's sake is a sufficient motivating reason to do the right thing, but for Hauerwas the person's moral example alone is sufficient enough motivating reason for imitating the example. In the latter case though, the example is an example of an action done from the motive of duty in Kant's sense,

presumably. Hence, the difference between Kant and Hauerwas on this point is much less than Hauerwas believes.

Conclusion

Based on the conclusions of my examination of the role exemplars in Hauerwas' moral theory and in light of their role in Aristotle and Kant, I have arrived at a better way moral exemplars could work in a moral theory like Hauerwas'. An exemplarism grounded on the person Jesus will essentially involve the use of moral principles. The narratives that are normative for Hauerwas portray Jesus using moral principles in his ethics. Jesus' life involves his example and his teachings. The teachings involve moral principles, and Hauerwas' emphasis on non-violent pacifism is a moral principle taught by Jesus, though it may be conceptualized in terms of a virtue as well. Moral principles also would be better suited for contemporary moral practice. Simply observing the behavior of Jesus in narratives of the New Testament Gospels will not tell contemporary readers which features of his example are normative for others. Jesus teaches his followers which features are obligatory. Pedagogically, since Jesus uses principles and commands in his teachings those same principles are essential to a moral pedagogy that views Jesus as a moral standard. Because an exemplarism in the robust Hauerwasian sense is concerned with the example of Jesus, the pedagogy would also involve imitating the life and actions of Jesus. However, his actions and example will need to be interpreted in light of Jesus' moral principles to know which features of his example are normative for his followers.

If any system of morality grounds its theory in the person of Jesus Christ, it will need to have a theoretical, epistemological, and pedagogical role for moral principles as well. This is consistent with an exemplarism like Hauerwas'. The theory is grounded in a person's example and it is through the exemplar's teaching that others come to know moral truths and grow morally themselves. One, therefore, could have a exemplarism in the fullest sense of the term or in a more narrow sense, but whatever the scope of the exemplarism, it would need to involve a role for the moral teachings of the exemplar. Particularly, the role of Jesus in a Christian ethics such as Hauerwas' must give considerable attention to the role of commands and moral principles in conjunction with the example of Jesus. In the end, a proper and robust Christian ethics that gives a theoretical function to a moral example like Jesus will be a hybrid theory with deontological and virtue-oriented features. This may not be an extraordinary proposal, but it shows that theological ethicists like Hauerwas who are concerned with who we should be rather than what we should do are missing something important. Jesus seems equally concerned with what we should do as well as who we should be. Both notions are intimately tied to the example of Jesus and the teachings of Jesus.

My approach as articulated thus far has two further virtues. First, my approach is a distinctively Christian ethics that is command-principlist in some sense without being a divine command theory. The second virtue of my approach is that it may be more amenable to non-Christian or non-religious ethicists than Hauerwas' theory. Since Hauerwas would say that membership in a certain moral community and faith is needed in order to pick out Jesus as a moral exemplar, he lacks the ability to give reasons why

those outside his moral community should be like Jesus. My approach has a strong theoretical base to appeal to for why others should want to be like Jesus, because it maintains that there is a mutually supportive relationship between two principles. One, Jesus is an exemplar because his life exemplified, and he taught, the right sorts of principles; and two, the principles Jesus espoused and manifested are morally admirable because they are Jesus'. In other words, Jesus' status as an exemplar and his principles support each other mutually, resulting in a stronger and broader theoretical foundation than anything Hauerwas can appeal to.

One of the limitations of my research has been the scope of Hauerwas' exemplarism. He is not interested in the implications of his position for other moral theories. Hauerwas' prominent role of Jesus as the supreme moral exemplar will be de facto problematic for many non-religious ethicists. Because he grounds his moral theory in the person of Jesus, I have thought it important to address problems internal to his theory itself. Therefore, the criticisms and proposals of this chapter were restricted particularly to the role of Jesus in his exemplarism, rather than criticisms dealing with exemplarism more generally, looking for ways an exemplarism that grounds its morality in the example of Jesus may work better.

The entire subject of moral exemplars in moral theory, whether that be in theological or philosophical ethics, needs more attention in the literature. More research and study on the role of moral exemplars in moral reflection will help to make the distinctions and nuances important to any philosophical discussion. When exemplars are addressed in the literature the various distinctions made in this work are not made and are

usually conflated. More research into exemplars in moral theory and practice will produce more and important distinctions and features of exemplars that would be helpful for those ethicists that want to emphasis them like Hauerwas and Linda Zagzebski. My hope is that this thesis has contributed to this project.

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